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AN ACCOUNTABILITY COMETH:  
AMEND 42 USC SECTION 1983 AND 18 USC SECTIONS 241, 242,  
THEREBY INITIATING A PATH TO REIMAGINING PEACE OFFICERS  
ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAW© 
 





An indispensable change in the law is respectfully requested, giving American 
citizens a fair chance of prevailing against the State for systemic and habitual police 
abuse, which in certain circumstances ultimately leads to unjustifiable homicide. 
This change in the law should send specific and general deterrence to rogue peace 
officers who harm American citizens, ensuring they will be held accountable both 
civilly and criminally, thus meeting with justice in our courts of law. Moreover, 
this change in the law will help elevate the reputation of state peace officers to the 
highest professional standards and help ensure the policies, custom, and practice of 
civilian engagement is always fair and balanced—and only lethal when clearly 
warranted by indisputable felonious conduct threatening the lives of others. 
 
* Colonel James M. Durant III is a retired Air Force Judge Advocate; he is currently a chief 
counsel with the US DOE. He has an extensive record as criminal prosecutor and was a 
Commissioner (judge) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, hearing International War Claims cases. Mr. 
Durant served two appointments as a Special Assistant United States Attorney (in Texas and 
California). He was a Law Professor and Deputy Department Head at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy, where he taught Constitutional law. As a prosecutor, Mr. Durant has handled numerous 
cases involving law enforcement misconduct; and has on occasion trained Air Force law 
enforcement on certain Constitutional rights. An internationally recognized speaker, he has 
lectured in Germany on implicit bias before judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys; similarly, 
he lectured in Toronto Canada on implicit bias as well as Belfast Ireland on Transformation of the 
Law. A Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) expert, Mr. Durant starred in an Air Force Air Combat 
Command training video on LOAC, annually training 1000s of Air Force members world-wide. 
At present, Mr. Durant is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Senior Executives Association 
of the United States, serves on the Board of Governors for the American Bar Association (ABA), 
is the Secretary-Treasurer for the Chicago Federal Executives Board, a Member of the ABA 
International Judicial Standards Task Force, an American Bar Foundation Life Fellow, and a 
Fellow of the ABA Young Lawyers Division. 
 
DISCLAIMER: Comments by Mr. Durant herein this paper are his own personal comments and 
do not reflect the policies or opinions of the United States Department of Energy, the US 
Department of the Air Force or the US Department of Justice. 
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Law enforcement is one of the most stressful occupations in our country.1 
American citizens depend upon those sworn to protect and serve to honor their oath 
of office. Yet approximately 3 to 5% of law enforcement officers commit heinous 
crimes against American citizenry under the color of law.2 Moreover, through their 
felonious criminal actions, low percent of rogue peace officers tarnish the 
reputations of the 95-98% of honorable peace officers. When the criminal actions 
of rogue officers are condoned and accepted by other peace officers and ratified by 
summary dismissals in the criminal justice system, the entire criminal justice 
system—and all peace officers—become criminally implicated warranting 
appropriate indictment. 
Rogue peace officers are committing unjustifiable homicides at an alarming rate 
across the United States with an excessively disproportionate rate of deaths for 
African Americans.3 A 2012 study showed a homicide rate of .48 per 100,000 for 
African Americans versus .17 per 100,000 for Caucasians,4 and with only 16 states 
participating. Thus, for that reason alone, a change in the law with the goal of 
reimagining5 the American peace officer is indeed needed, warranted, and 
respectfully requested. 
 




2 “I would agree that the 3-5 percent average of rouge officers across the state is notable; however, 
I would strongly add that it is much larger when you factor-in other officers that idly stand by and 
watch rouge police officers commit violations of the law and violate a citizen’s Constitutional 
rights. This is what makes the problem larger in scope verses just the 3-5% alone—this is where 
the magnitude of the problem increases dramatically.” Interview with Detective Lieutenant Lewis 
Langham, Mich. State Police Retired and Law Professor Emeritus of L. at W. Mich. Univ., Cooley 
Sch. of L. (July 1, 2020). 
3 See Catherine Barber et.al., Homicides by Police: Comparing Counts from the National Violent 
Death Reporting System, Vital Statistics, and Supplementary Homicide Reports, 106(5) AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 922, (2016) (From 2005 to 2012 a study was conducted across 16 states where 1,552 
police shootings resulting in death were statistically evaluated. In this study, the researchers 
discovered that African Americans accounted for 0.48 per 100,000; Hispanics accounted for 0.25 
per 100,000; and Caucasians accounted for 0.17 per 100.000). 
4 Id. 
5 Reimaging is not the act of defunding police departments. It is the reallocation of municipal 
funding to entities that are better suited and equipped to manage community social and health 
functions. The dilemma concerns police units being over exposed and ill-equipped to manage 
these issues, which are better left to, for example, mental health professionals. And often times, 
peace officers are expected to deal with these matters with little to no training or experience, and 










Similarly, a change in the law is also respectfully requested to give the U.S. 
Attorney a fair chance to zealously represent the United States in criminal 
proceedings against rogue peace officers and those criminally responsible in the 
rogue peace officers’ chain of authority, including but not limited to, the state’s 
attorney. Over 150 years ago, Congress spoke to this issue with the passage of the 
1866 Civil Rights Act,6 the 1870 and 1871 Ku Klux Klan Acts,7 and later as 
 
During an interview by Megan McCain on The View, Vice President-elect, Kamala Harris, 
discussed the concept of defunding the police, or as she termed it, “reimagining public safety.” 
VP-elect Harris explained that her view is not to simply defund the police, but to better allocate 
community funds to social and mental health programs necessitating support. She explained that 
there are areas that police are basically ill-equipped to engage in as a matter of law enforcement 
and that some officers have told her that they do not want to engage in certain social or health 
matters. Seth Cohen, Reimagine The Police? Kamala Harris’s Optimistic View of The “Defund” 
Debate, FORBES (June 8, 2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethcohen/2020/06/08/ragine-the-
police-kamala-harris/; see also Law Journal Editorial Board, Reimagine the Role of Police, NEW 
JERSEY LAW JOURNAL (June 8, 2020) https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2020/06/28/reimagine-
the-role-of-police/ (“A gradual process of strategically reallocating resources, funding, and 
responsibility away from police toward community-based models of safety, support, and 
prevention will go a long way towards bettering our society”). 
6 History, Art & Archives: U.S. House of Representatives, The Civil Rights Bill of 1866, Historical 
Highlights, https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-Civil-Rights-Bill-of-
1866/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2020). 
7 See U.S. SENATE, THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF 1870 AND 1871 (2020), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/EnforcementActs.htm (“The 
adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution extended 
civil and legal protections to former slaves and prohibited states from disenfranchising voters ‘on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ Forces in some states were at work, 
however, to deny black citizens their legal rights. Members of the Ku Klux Klan, for example, 
terrorized black citizens for exercising their right to vote, running for public office, and serving on 
juries. In response, Congress passed a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871 (also known 
as the Force Acts) to end such violence and empower the president to use military force to protect 
African Americans…While these committees were investigating southern attempts to impede 
Reconstruction, the Senate passed two more Force acts, also known as the Ku Klux Klan acts, 
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Second 
Force Act, which became law in February 1871, placed administration of national elections under 
the control of the federal government and empowered federal judges and United States marshals to 
supervise local polling places. The Third Force Act, dated April 1871, empowered the president to 
use the armed forces to combat those who conspired to deny equal protection of the laws and to 
suspend habeas corpus, if necessary, to enforce the act. While the Force acts and the publicity 
generated by the joint committee temporarily helped put an end to the violence and intimidation, 
the end of formal Reconstruction in 1877 allowed for a return of largescale disenfranchisement of 
African Americans”). 
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amended, 42 U.S.C § 1983,8 and 18 U.S.C § 241 and 242.9 Yet every day, American 
citizens are subjected to arbitrary, offensive, abusive, and targeted discriminatory 
justice, including unjustifiable homicide by those cloaked in the color of state law 
who are sworn to uphold the law and protect citizens. 
And what has been the response by our judicial system on police abuse matters 
properly brought before the bench since 1871? Abysmal, varied, inconsistent 
rulings, leading to abject miscarriages of justice. Such miscarriages call for 
indictments against judicial systems for rulings that violate the rights, privileges, 
and immunities of American citizens, in particular, African American citizens, as 
articulated in the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Too long our Republic has relied upon inconsistent, unprincipled and 
varied judicial interpretations of clearly established Congressional legislative 
intent.10 Too many reversals, dismissals, and affirmations supporting political 
pressures, along with legal theories anchored in supposition and indeed academic 
conjecture, and, in many instances, outcomes that verge on the absurd in cases 
clearly warranting justice. 
 
8 “‘Section 1983 Litigation’ refers to lawsuits brought under Section 1983 (Civil action for 
deprivation of rights) of Title 42 of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 
provides an individual the right to sue state government employees and others acting ‘under color 
of state law’ for civil rights violations. Section 1983 does not provide civil rights; it is a means to 
enforce civil rights that already exist.” Civil Rights in the United States, UNIVERSITY OF 
MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL, https://libguides.law.umn.edu/c.php?g=125765&p=2893387 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
9 “Any person acting under the color of law who ‘willfully’ subjects any person to the deprivation 
of rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the US, or to 
different punishments, pains, or penalties on account of the person being an alien, or by reason of 
his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” Under Section 241 it is a 
crime “for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
person…in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” Joanna R. Lampe, Federal Police Oversight: 
Criminal Civil Rights Violations Under 18 U.S.C. § 242, Congressional Research Service: Legal 
Sidebar (June 15, 2020) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10495. 
10 “Legislative intent, also referred to as legislative history or legislative purpose, is a relatively 
recent tool in statutory construction. Loosely defined as “the documents that contain the 
information considered by the legislature prior to reaching its decision to enact a law, the 
legislative history of a statute is consulted in order to better understand the reasons for the 
enactment of a statute. Since an act of the legislature is not always drafted with the most precise 
language, courts look to the intrinsic aids in determining the intent of a legislative body…Studying 
the background and events that led to a bill's passage, as well as the social, economic, and political 
climate of the period may also be helpful in determining legislative intent.” Legislative Intent: 
New York State Legislative Intent, NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY (Aug. 26, 2020) 
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/legint.htm. 
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Furthermore, the statutory requirement of 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242 requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer “intended” to violate a citizen’s 
constitutional rights has been allowed to stall criminal cases worthy of a criminal 
indictment for crimes committed upon and against an American citizen.11 We 
know, for example, that in most situations, the subject peace officer has little to no 
intention of violating a person’s civil rights while engaged in clear police abuse. 
For example, consider the events stemming up to an almost fatal shooting of an 
unarmed American in the back or the shooting of an American citizen sitting in his 
vehicle. In these circumstances and others, the peace officer is more than likely 
acting out of presumed fear, apprehension, rage, bias, racism, etc. It is exceptionally 
doubtful that in these circumstances rogue peace officers actually realize they are 
violating the Constitutional rights of American citizens; and sadly, their felonious 
acts characterize a marked departure from their sworn duty to protect and serve. 
Yet, these rogue peace officers’ rightfully earned appointment with justice is 
universally thwarted under the specific intent to violate a citizen’s Constitutional 
rights prong of 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242, again resulting in a paucity of criminal 
indictments for such crimes. 
Our Legislative Representatives must amend the requisite statutes to strengthen 
the appropriate rule of law, thus reducing systemic state police abuse and helping 
ensure no other American citizens lose their lives at the hands of rogue state peace 
officers acting on their own accord under the color of state law. In addition, 
amending these statutes will ensure those responsible for hiring and managing 
rogue peace officers are equally held criminally and civilly accountable. The courts 
have failed the Republic in effectuating the specific legislative intent to “enforce 




11 “The poor performance of federal prosecutors is due, in part, to the difficulties in prosecuting 
police officers generally (such as typically unsympathetic victims, witnesses who are not credible, 
the public's predisposition to believe police officers) and by the added requirement, as interpreted 
by the courts, that prosecutors prove the accused officer's ‘specific intent’ to deprive an individual 
of his or her civil rights. As a result of the ‘specific intent’ requirement and other stringent 
standards, federal prosecutors - who like their local counterparts are interested in winning cases, 
not merely trying them - may be less than eager to pursue cases against police officers. Human 
Rights Watch believes that it should be sufficient for federal criminal prosecution that a police 
officer intentionally and unjustifiably beat or killed a victim without the additional burden of 
having a specific intent to violate the victim's civil rights.” Human Rights Watch, Shielded from 
Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States, Federal Passivity, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo33.htm. 
12 Lampe, supra note 9, at 2. 
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“My philosophy is very simple - when you see something that is not right, not fair, 
not just, say something, do something. Get in trouble, good trouble, necessary 
trouble.”13 
 
- The Great Late Representative John Lewis 
 
We know the facts, the statistics, and the reality of police abuse across this nation 
and the inconvertible truth of the disproportionate injustices committed against 
Americans of African descent. Since 2015, African Americans account for 30 
deaths per million (1,252 total) of Americans killed by peace officers, whereas 
Caucasian Americans account for only 12 deaths per million (2,385 total).14 Bottom 
line, African Americans are 2.5 times more likely to be killed by peace officers than 
Caucasian Americans:15 
 
Black Americans are disproportionately affected by police violence 
across the United States. The data refers specifically to police 
shootings and it relies primarily on news accounts, social media 
postings and police reports. Since January 01, 2015, 4,728 people 
have died in police shootings and around half, 2,385, were white. 
1,252 were Black, 877 were Hispanic and 214 were from other racial 
groups. As a share of the population, however, things are very 
different. Black Americans account for less than 13% [however, 
most people killed are African American males who constitute less 
than 7% of the U.S. population]16 of the U.S. population but the rate 
 
13 Documentary Honors Civil Rights Leader Rep. John Lewis, NPR: Morning Edition (July 20, 
2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/07/20/892943749/documentary-honors-civil-rights-leader-rep-
john-lewis. 
14 Wesley Lowery, Aren’t more white people than black people killed by police? Yes, but no, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, (July 11, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/07/11/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no/. 
15 Id. 
16 2010 Census Briefs, “The Black Population,” U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts United States, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 (last visited Oct. 31, 2020); See also 
Ashley Nellis, Ph.D., The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (Jun. 14, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-
justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ (“African Americans are incarcerated in state 
prisons at a rate that is 5.1 times the imprisonment of whites. In five states (Iowa, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin), the disparity is more than 10 to 1; In twelve states, more than 
half of the prison population is black: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Maryland, 
whose prison population is 72% African American, tops the nation. In eleven states, at least 1 in 
20 adult black males is in prison. In Oklahoma, the state with the highest overall black 
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at which they are shot and killed by police is more than twice as high 
as the rate for white Americans.17 
 
We also know that our country was conceived with a birth defect, or race 
dysfunction, as far back as 1619 with the institution of slavery, mass genocide, high 
crimes against Native Persons,18 segregation backed by law against Americans of 
African descent,19 inhumane medical testing of non-willing African American 
citizens spanning over 40 years (1932-1972),20 mass incarceration of African 
 
incarceration rate, 1 in 15 black males ages 18 and older is in prison. States exhibit substantial 
variation in the range of racial disparity, from a black/white ratio of 12.2:1 in New Jersey to 2.4:1 
in Hawaii. Latinos are imprisoned at a rate that is 1.4 times the rate of whites. Hispanic/white 
ethnic disparities are particularly high in states such as Massachusetts (4.3:1), Connecticut (3.9:1), 
Pennsylvania (3.3:1), and New York (3.1:1).”). 
17 Niall McCarthy, Police Shootings: Black Americans Disproportionately Affected [Infographic], 
Forbes (May 28, 2020, 6:03 a.m.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/05/28/police-
shootings-black-americans-disproportionately-affected-infographic/?sh=719fd6cb59f7. 
18 “On September 8, 2000, the head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) formally apologized for 
the agency's participation in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Western tribes. From the forced relocation 
and assimilation of the ‘[savaged]’ to the white man's way of life to the forced sterilization of 
Native Americans, the BIA set out to ‘destroy all things Indian.’ Through the exploration of the 
United States' Federal Indian policy, it is evident that this policy intended to ‘destroy, in whole or 
in part,’ the Native American population. The extreme disparity in the number of Native American 
people living within the United States' borders at the time Columbus arrived, approximately ten 
million compared to the approximate 2.4 million Indians and Eskimos alive in the United States 
today, is but one factor that illustrates the success of the government's plan of ‘Manifest Destiny.’” 
Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 the United States 
Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide 
Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 911-12 (2002). 
19 See Richard Rothstein, What Have We – De Facto Racial Isolation or De Jure Segregation?, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, (July 1, 2014) 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2014_vol_4
0/vol_40_no_3_poverty/racial_isolation_or_segregation/. 
20 “The intent of the study was to record the natural history of syphilis in [600 Black men]. The 
study was called the ‘Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male.’ When the study 
was initiated there were no proven treatments for the disease. Researchers told the men 
participating in the study that they were to be treated for ‘bad blood.’ This term was used locally 
by people to describe a host of diagnosable ailments including but not limited to anemia, fatigue, 
and syphilis…A total of 600 men were enrolled in the study. Of this group 399, who had syphilis 
were a part of the experimental group and 201 were control subjects. Most of the men were poor 
and illiterate sharecroppers from the county.” In exchange for their participation, “[t]he men were 
offered what most Negroes could only dream of in terms of medical care and survivors insurance. 
They were enticed and enrolled in the study with incentives including: medical exams, rides to and 
from the clinics, meals on examination days, free treatment for minor ailments and guarantees that 
provisions would be made after their deaths in terms of burial stipends paid to their survivors.” 
About the USPHS Syphilis Study, TUSKEGEE UNIVERSITY, https://www.tuskegee.edu/about-
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Americans,21 state enforced deprivation of property, and mass detainment of 
Americans of Japanese descent without any due process under the 5th nor 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,22 etc. As a republic, however, we must right 
some of these wrongs. Such efforts have often been limited by the with all 
deliberate speed formula.23 Bottom line, effectuating the principles of equal justice 
under law takes strong community action and appropriate legislation as enunciated 
in the 14th Amendment. This is our social justice agenda, or more appropriately 
stated, our social justice journey, a path traveled by the few but impacts the many. 
Unfortunately, this journey continues to be challenged by those who view 
oppression, discrimination, racism, and animus bias, as a normative core value set 
supported by evangelical notions of racial supremacy and grandeur. This 
perspective ignores the common fundamental principles of justice and fairness 
rooted in the American fabric of a Republic For and By the People. Again, the 
results include but are not limited to egregious and disproportionate incarceration 
 
us/centers-of-excellence/bioethics-center/about-the-usphs-syphilis-study  (last visited Sept. 6, 
2020). 
21 “Nationally, according to the U.S. Census, Blacks are incarcerated five times more than Whites 
are, and Hispanics are nearly twice as likely to be incarcerated as Whites.” Leah Sakala, Breaking 
Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by 
Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html?c=pie&gclid=CjwKCAjwtNf6BRAwEiwAkt6UQ
umH_DVUN4BnbcLDbGci-Pma2CAYh7_nMPdVUi4ROkfw379gFDV6bBoCLnQQAvD_BwE. 
22 “During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which called 
for more than 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry to be held without trial in detention sites 
throughout U.S. Over two- thirds of those imprisoned were U.S. citizens” Kara Matsuzawa, 
Japanese American Internment Camps, MOUNT HOLYOKE COLL., (Spring 2009) 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~matsu22k/classweb/. 
23 Jim Chen, With All Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegregation's Children, 24 L. & INEQ. 1, 
3 (2006) (“The infamous ‘all deliberate speed’ formula and the South's massive resistance to 
desegregation arguably dissipated much of Brown I’s promise. At a minimum, Brown II’s ‘all 
deliberate speed’ formula enabled public school districts in the South to delay desegregation for 
more than a decade. Nine years after Brown II, an exasperated Supreme Court finally declared that 
‘[t]he time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.”); see also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 375 
U.S. 391, 392 (1964), cert. granted (“In view of the long delay in the case since our decision in 
the Brown [1954/1955] case and the importance of the questions presented, we grant certiorari and 
put the case down for argument March 30, 1964, on the merits, as we have done in other 
comparable situations without waiting for final action by the Court of Appeals.”). 
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rates,24 abysmal access to health care,25 minimal access to justice,26 widely 
disproportionate accumulation of wealth,27 massively unequal employment rates,28 
mass separation of detained undocumented immigrant children from their parents,29 
 
24 Sakala , supra note 21. 
25 See Vann R. Newkirk II, America’s Health Segregation Problem Has the country done enough 
to overcome its Jim Crow health care history, THE ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/americas-health-segregation-
problem/483219/; See also Robin Osborn et. al., In new survey of 11 Countries, US Adults Still 
Struggle with Access to and Affordability to Health Care, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 16, 
2016) https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/journal-article/2016/nov/new-survey-11-
countries-us-adults-still-struggle-access-and. 
26 See U.S. Department of Justice Office for Access to Justice, https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj 
(“Department of Justice established the Office for Access to Justice (ATJ) in Mar. 2010 to address 
the access-to-justice crisis in the criminal and civil justice system. ATJ’s mission is to help the 
justice system efficiently deliver outcomes that are fair and accessible to all, irrespective of wealth 
and status. ATJ staff works within the Department of Justice, across federal agencies, and with 
state, local, and tribal justice system stakeholders to increase access to counsel and legal assistance 
and to improve the justice delivery systems that serve people who are unable to afford lawyers.”); 
see also statement by immediate past president of the American Bar Association, Judy. Perry 
Martinez. “For too long, African Americans have borne the brunt of racism through laws that 
unjustly and disproportionately impact people of color. Through efforts like this website, we want 
to make it easier for lawyers to access information and become more involved in reforming our 
laws and improving the justice system.” American Bar Association Launches New Racial Justice 
Resource (June 15, 2020). 
27 “A close examination of wealth in the U.S. finds evidence of staggering racial disparities. At 
$171,000, the net worth of a typical white family is nearly ten times greater than that of a Black 
family ($17,150) in 2016. Gaps in wealth between Black and white households reveal the effects 
of accumulated inequality and discrimination, as well as differences in power and opportunity that 
can be traced back to this nation’s inception. The Black-white wealth gap reflects a society that 
has not and does not afford equality of opportunity to all its citizens” Kriston McIntosh et. al., 
Examining the Black-white wealth Gap, BROOKINGS, (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/. 
28 “In 2018, the overall unemployment rate (jobless rate) for the United States was 3.9 percent; 
however, the rate varied across race and ethnicity groups. Among the race groups, jobless rates 
were higher than the national rate for American Indians and Alaska Natives (6.6 percent), Blacks 
or African Americans (6.5 percent), people categorized as being of Two or More Races (5.5 
percent), and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders (5.3 percent). Jobless rates were lower 
than the national rate for Asians (3.0 percent) and Whites (3.5 percent). The rate for people of 
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, at 4.7 percent, was higher than the rate of 3.7 percent for non-
Hispanics.” Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2018, BUREAU OF LABOR AND 
STATISTICS AND REPORTS (Oct. 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-
ethnicity/2018/home.htm. 
29 “Approximately 5,500 migrant children have been separated from their parents by the Trump 
Administration — not 2,800 as originally estimated — according to the ACLU who received a 
court-ordered accounting of each of the families by the government on Thursday. The accounting 
shows an additional 1,556 children were separated and approximately 1,000 children have been 
9
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federal immigration religious intolerance,30 and for the purpose of this thesis, 
systemic and universal police abuse against American citizens of African descent 
by sworn peace officers of the law. Furthermore, out of Reconstruction and the 
Amendments (specifically the 13th, 14th, and 15th) over two million new American 
Citizens (former enslaved Africans) were brought into our republic. Despite the 
Amendments, and the statutes promulgated by Congress into law effectuating the 
promises of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, courts have diminished 
and or ignored Congress’s specific legislative intent.31 In consequence, millions of 
American citizens are segregated, oppressed, harassed, disproportionately 
incarcerated and ultimately murdered by those presumptively acting under the color 
of law. Importantly, in several cases, justices interpreted and re-interpreted facts 
resulting in the arguable antithesis of the primary purpose of legislation stemming 
from the Reconstruction Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
One example is a criminal measure under 18 U.S.C § 242 (and 241). This statute 
originated from § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and was expanded in 1874 to 
enforce the protections of the 14th Amendment for the Constitution by “appropriate 
 
separated from their parents since the practice was declared over by the Trump Administration in 
June 2018.” Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Separation at the 
U.S. Boarder, Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME (Oct. 25, 2019), https://time.com/5678313/trump-
administration-family-separation-lawsuits/. 
30 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 250, 272 (4th Cir. 2018) (“On 
January 27, 2017—seven days after taking the oath of office—President Donald J. Trump signed 
Executive Order 13,769, ‘Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United 
States’ (‘EO-1’), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(f), President Trump immediately suspended for ninety days the immigrant and 
nonimmigrant entry of foreign aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen…On a fundamental level, the Proclamation second-
guesses our nation’s dedication to religious freedom and tolerance The basic purpose of the 
religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of 
religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of 
attainment of that end.”). 
31 “In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that it was unconstitutional for the federal 
government to penalize crimes such as assault and murder. It declared that the local governments 
have the power to penalize these crimes. In United States v. Harris, also known as the Ku Klux 
case, four men were removed from a Crockett County, Tenn., jail by a KKK-affiliated group led 
by County Sheriff R.G. Harris. They were beaten and one of them was killed. A deputy sheriff 
tried, but failed, to prevent what occurred. The court ruled that an act to enforce the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause applied only to state action and not to state inaction. Under this thinking, 
the 14th Amendment authorized the federal government to take remedial action only when state 
actions, not those of individuals, violated the amendment”). Andrew Glass, Grant signs KKK Act 
into law, Apr. 20, 1871, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/20/this-day-in-politics-april-20-1279376. 
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legislation.”32 Section 242 implicitly outlines measures by the U.S. Attorney to 
criminally punish those persons who subjects any person to: 
 
A deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or who 
execute different punishments, pains, or penalties on account of 
such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than 
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.33 
 
As case law and facts hold, however, the efficacy of § 242 has been diminished by 
judicial fiat and the failure to exercise § 242 by those empowered to use it to ensure 
justice for all American Citizens, i.e., the United States Department of Justice. Even 
worse, as will be discussed later, excuses not to prosecute state actors who clearly 
violate § 242 include a “lack of resources.” 
Similarly, for civil actions against those acting under the color of law violating 
a citizen’s rights under the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C § 1983 is rooted in the 1871 
Ku Klux Klan Act, § 1979. However, § 1979 was not effectively used until 1961 
with Monroe et al. v. Pape et al.34 In this case, Mr. Monroe asserted federal 
jurisdiction under section R.S. 1979 for 13 officers in Chicago who entered his 
home without a search warrant or an arrest warrant and searched his home for a two 
day old murder without ever approaching a magistrate. In the complaint, it is 
alleged that: 
 
[Thirteen] Chicago police officers broke into petitioners' home in 
the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in 
the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and 
ripping mattress covers. It further alleges that Mr. Monroe was then 
taken to the police station and detained on “open” charges for 10 
hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder, that 
he was not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible, 
that he was not permitted to call his family or attorney, that he was 
subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred 
against him. It is alleged that the officers had no search warrant and 
no arrest warrant and that they acted “under color of the statutes, 
ordinances, regulations, customs and usages” of Illinois and of the 
City of Chicago. Federal jurisdiction was asserted under R. S. § 
 
32 Lampe, supra note 9, at 1. 
33 18 U.S.C. § 242 (West 2020). 
34 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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1979, which we have set out above, and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 and 28 
U. S. C. § 1331.35 
 
Mr. Monroe filed in District Court, which dismissed his complaint, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas reversed the 
Court of Appeals ruling, stating that § 1979 sought to give plaintiffs a federal 
remedy for abuse where state law did not provide a remedy and to override certain 
state laws that violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.36 
 
The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities 
liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by 
the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe 
that the word “person” was used in this particular Act to include 
them. Accordingly we hold that the motion to dismiss the complaint 
against the City of Chicago was properly granted. But since the 
complaint should not have been dismissed against the officials the 
judgment must be and is Reversed.37 
 
Thus, for reasons discussed, we call upon our elected officials to enact legislation 
to remedy the contemporary societal ills affecting Americans of African descent 
who are universally plagued at the hands of a select minority of peace officers, who 
effectuate selective racially motivated justice against this group of Americans 
citizens. Through this change in the law, we hope to ensure in the clearest sense, 
the privileges immunities first articulated in the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and to account and correct for the wrongs embraced and supported by 
our criminal justice system. In essence, a reimagining of the term Peace Officer 
needs to be communicated to ensure viable change, real substantial change. 
Moreover, this change in the law, and for this thesis, is merely a starting point 
for a long overdue social justice journey down the Avenue of Monumental Change. 
It is also a call to send a clear message to the minority of peace officers to critically 
think before denying a citizen his or her civil rights or using lethal force, especially 
in those situations where the officer’s training should dictate a response involving 
something less than deadly force. Michigan State Police Officer, Lt. Arden Bow 
(Ret.) termed this a “force continuum,” whereby the level of the suspected offense 
 
35 Id. at 169. 
36 Id. at 172, 187. 
37 Id. at 191-92. 
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dictates whether “guns come out.”38 Sadly, as is reported almost weekly, in most 
cases where an American of African descent is executed by a peace officer, the 
primary offense was a misdemeanor, and yet “guns came out.” 
The concept of “guns out” is a response to the situation the officer finds himself 
in and what logical actions he needs to take to limit loss of life of others and himself. 
Recall the case where Charles Kinsey, a mental health care worker, who was 
assisting his mental patient, clearly not a threat to others in the immediate area, and 
a peace officer, Jonathan Aledda, shot Mr. Kinsey while aiming at his patient who 
had a toy truck in his hand. When Peace Officer Aledda arrived at the scene, which 
was already occupied and controlled by other officers, he was over 50 feet away. 
Nevertheless, he discharged his weapon, striking Charles Kinsey in the leg. The 
jury was deadlocked on the attempted felony manslaughter charges but acquitted 
Officer Aledda of a misdemeanor culpable negligence charge. In the Aledda case: 
  
State Attorney Katherine Fernandez Rundle said in a statement after 
the mistrial that the case demonstrated how difficult it is to get a 
conviction in officer-involved shootings because Florida law gives 
wide leeway to police officers in such cases. Rundles said her 
prosecution team will discuss the option of retrying the officer on 
the felony counts.39 
 
At the time of the shooting, Peace Officer Aledda, did not know that Mr. Kinsey, 
who was African American, was a health care worker and had the matter under 
control with his patient; in fact, Mr. Kinsey had his hands raised and told Officer 
Aledda not to shoot. Yet, guns came out and he shot Mr. Kinsey. Peace Officer 
Aledda’s apparent view of Mr. Kensey exhibited an implicit bias. Again, implicit 
bias training is often not effective because: 1) it is often taught by Americans of 
 
38 Telephone interview with Lieutenant Arden Bow, Retired., Mich. State Police former Post 
Commander for Michigan State Police Post Monroe #28 (July 14, 2020). Lieutenant Bow is a 
graduate of Washtenaw Community College and Wayne State University and 25-year veteran of 
the Michigan State Police Department. During his 25 years, he served at the Michigan State Police 
Battle Creek Post #46, Michigan State Police Detroit Freeway Post #29, Michigan State Police 
Training Academy (temporary staff), Ypsilanti Michigan State Police Post #26, and Saint Clair 
Post # 23. With a promotion to Lieutenant in 1988, he was assigned at the East Lansing State 
Police Headquarters, he later was assigned to Detective Lieutenant. He then became the Technical 
Unit Commander, later returning to the Detroit Freeway Post #29 as the Assistant Post 
Commander. His last promotion was First Lieutenant where he served as the Post Commander of 
Monroe Post #28. 
39 Clyde Hughes, Mistrial Declared in Trial of Florida Officer who Shot Mental Health Worker, 
UPI (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2019/03/16/Mistrial-declared-in-trial-
of-Florida-officer-who-shot-mental-health-worker/3811552748061/. 
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African Descent, 2) Peace officers do not perceive they need implicit bias training, 
and 3) it is a reactionary effort to an event.40 Thus, where is the accountability for 
this poor training? In June 2019, Peace Officer Aledda was finally convicted of this 
crime, but a jury only found him guilty of culpable negligence.41 
We request amending 42 U.S.C § 1983 and 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242 to roll 
back historical judicial misinterpretations of Congress’s clearest intent with those 
statues stemming from the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to enact 
appropriate legislation. With the recent indictment of four peace officers in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota,42 in May of 2020, who allegedly [sic] murdered Mr. 
George Floyd for the possession of an assumed $20 counterfeit note, a 2013 
 
40 See Interview with Michigan State Police Lieutenant Arden Bow, Ret., supra note 38. 
41 “The officer, Jonathan Aledda, was found not guilty of two counts of attempted manslaughter 
Monday in the shooting of Charles Kinsey, the caretaker for Arnaldo Rios Soto. The officer was 
convicted of exposing another person to personal injury, a misdemeanor with a penalty of one year 
in prison.” Elinor Aspegren, Police Office who Shot Caregiver of Man with Autism found Guilty of 
Negligence, USA TODAY (June 18, 2019, 3:15 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/18/florida-police-man-autism-caretaker-
shot-shooting/1485955001/. 
42 “Attorney General Ellison charges Derek Chauvin with 2nd-degree murder of George Floyd, 
three former officers with aiding and abetting 2nd-degree murder,” The Office of Minnesota’s 
Attorney General’s Keith Ellison (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/06/03_GeorgeFloyd.asp. (“I want to 
begin with a reminder of why we’re here today. We’re here today because George Floyd is not 
here. He should be here. He should be alive. But he is not. About nine days ago, the world 
watched Floyd utter his last words, ‘I can’t breathe,’ as he pleaded for his life. The world heard 
Floyd call out for his mama and cry out, ‘Don’t kill me.’ Just two days ago, when I became the 
lead prosecutor in the murder of Mr. Floyd, I asked for time to thoroughly review all the evidence 
in this case that’s available so far, even while the investigation is ongoing. I also said that that I 
know it’s a lot to ask people and communities who have suffered decades and centuries of 
injustice to be patient and to wait longer for justice. I thank you for the patience you’ve show me 
in the pursuit of justice so far. I am here today to make some announcements in the prosecution of 
the murder of George Floyd. First, today, I filed an amended complaint that charges former 
Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin with murder in the second degree for the death of 
George Floyd. I believe the evidence available to us now supports the stronger charge of second-
degree murder. Second, today, arrest warrants were issued for former Minneapolis police officers 
J.A. Kueng, Thomas Lane, and Tou Thao. Finally, today, Hennepin County Attorney Mike 
Freeman joined me in filing a complaint that charges former police officers Kueng, Lane, and 
Thao with aiding and abetting murder in the second degree, a felony offense. I strongly believe 
that these developments are in the interests of justice for Mr. Floyd, his family, our community, 
and our state. I’m the lead prosecutor on the State’s case and I will be speaking for it — and this is 
absolutely a team effort. I’ve assembled a strong team. We have one goal and one goal only: 
justice for George Floyd.”). 
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movement appropriately entitled Black Lives Matter43 was revitalized, and earned 
universal respect, across the United States and the globe. Millions of people in 
industrialized nations engaged in civil demonstrations in support of the slogan, 
Black Lives Matter (“BLM”), a response to the question of whether the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is applicable to 
Americans of African descent. African Americans are citizens too, vested equally 
with all rights and privileges of being a citizen of the United States. The irony of 
BLM is that it originated in a country whose very preamble to its constitution 
begins, “We The People.” Importantly, the BLM movement has garnered support 
across racial and international divisions, as many supporters are of European 
descent, or Caucasian—the “current” majority population in the United States.44 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief 
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, 
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 




43 “#BlackLivesMatter was founded in 2013 in response to the acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s 
murderer. Black Lives Matter Foundation, Inc is a global organization in the US, UK, and Canada, 
whose mission is to eradicate white supremacy and build local power to intervene in violence 
inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes. By combating and countering acts of 
violence, creating space for Black imagination and innovation, and centering Black joy, we are 
winning immediate improvements in our lives”). BLACK LIVES MATTER, About, 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
44 A recent survey reported that 67% of Americans “strongly support” Black Lives Matters. Of 
that figure, 31% of White Americans compared to 71% of Americans of African descent strongly 
supported BLM. Kim Parker, et al., Amid Protests, Majorities Across Racial and Ethnic Groups 
Express Support for the Black Lives Matter Movement: Deep partisan divides over factors 
underlying George Floyd demonstrations, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2020). 
45 SWORD & SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (Mary Massaron & 
Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2015). 
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One of the fundamental flaws with § 1983 actions, when proceeding against a 
municipality from a corporate approach, is the Plaintiff’s burden of proof. The 
current standard is “Deliberate Indifference,” which was judicially imposed. With 
Deliberate Indifference, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the government official denied the plaintiff her Constitutional rights. 
Deliberate Indifference goes beyond simple negligence;46 it speaks to a conscious 
disregard for a knowledgeable and substantial risk of harm.47 
Another problem with § 1983 actions is that even in the most egregious 
circumstances, for example, when a peace officer’s actions result in the senseless 
death of a citizen, the peace officer is shielded from personal accountability by 
Qualified Immunity. “Qualified Immunity balances two important interests—the 
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly 
and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.”48 
In addition to Qualified Immunity, the officer is also protected by a long history 
of iron-clad bargaining agreements defended by labor unions, making it next to 
impossible for the officer to be subjected to an “appropriate” disciplinary action. 
The usual circumstance in these cases results in the peace officer being placed on 
administrative leave with pay or relegated to “other assigned duties” not necessarily 
involving dealing with citizens. 
Venturing beyond the civil perspective of fairness in the criminal justice 
system, the criminal perspective is also flawed, resulting in a paucity of criminal 
indictments for clear police abuse. The prosecutorial burden makes it next to 
impossible to prove a specification of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Under 18 U.S.C § 242, prosecutors can proceed against peace officers criminally 
under limited circumstances. However, this type of prosecution is rarely used. One 
of the reasons, beyond the obvious political considerations warranting guarded 
 
46 See What is deliberate indifference according to 42 U.S.C. 1983?, NOLL LAW, 
https://www.noll-law.com/deliberate-indifference-according-42-u-s-c-1983/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2020); see also Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (1996). 
47 See Proffitt v. Ridgeway, 279 F3d 503, 506 (7th Cir 2002). 
48 “…[T]his court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving government officials’ qualified 
immunity claims. First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown 
make out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, 
the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s 
alleged misconduct. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a 
clearly established constitutional right.” (internal citations omitted). Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 232 (2009). 
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judicial restraint, is the burden of proof that the peace officer acted with specific 
intent.49 
This statute requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
suspect peace officer acted with specific intent to violate a Constitutional Right in 
the commission of the felony offense against the citizen. Section 242 has three 
essential elements that must be met: “first, the defendant [sic] peace officer acted 
‘under color of law’; second, the defendant acted ‘willfully’; and third, the 
defendant deprived the victim of rights under the Constitution or federal law or 
subjected the victim to different punishments on account of the victim’s race, color, 
or alien status.”50 This “willfully” requirement differs from a standard punitive 
measure only requiring the act, or in the case of, for example, murder one, “the 
intent” prong is necessary to prove the charge; without it, the charge is reduced to 
a lesser form of homicide, e.g., manslaughter or murder in the heat of passion. The 
18 U.S.C § 242, the criminal prong of a 1983 action, states: 
 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different 
punishments, pains, or penalties on account of such person being an 
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the 
punishment of citizens, shall be FINED under this title or 
IMPRISONED not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury 
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such 
acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous 
weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results 
from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts 
 
49 Lampe, supra note 9, at 3. (“By its text, Section 242 applies only to violations that are 
committed ‘willfully’. The Supreme Court stringently construed the willfulness standard in the 
1945 case Screws v. United States (the main opinion in Screws was joined by only four justices, 
but binding opinions of the Supreme Court have since adopted its analysis). In Screws, a defendant 
convicted of violating the statute now codified as Section 242 argued that the law was void for 
vagueness—that is, it violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it did not give 
potential defendants clear notice of the conduct it proscribed. The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument by interpreting ‘willfully’ to require the government to show that a defendant acted with 
a ‘specific intent to deprive a person’ of constitutional rights or with ‘open defiance or in reckless 
disregard of a constitutional requirement.”). 
50 Id. at p. 2. 
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including kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual 
abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an 
attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any 
term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to DEATH.51 
 
In sum, the “specific intent” statutory requirement of § 242, or mens rea, is 
inherently an impediment to an effective and fair prosecution of a state actor alleged 
to have committed a wrong under § 242: 
 
In criminal law, mens rea and actus reus are two distinguishing 
elements of most charges. Mens rea regards a guilty mind and actus 
reus regards a guilty act. “Mens Rea,” or “guilty mind,” marks a 
central distinguishing feature of criminal law. An injury caused 
without mens rea might be grounds for civil liability but typically 
not for criminal. Criminal liability requires not only causing a 
prohibited harm or evil -- the “actus reus” of an offense – but also a 
particular state of mind with regard to causing that harm or evil. … 
Mens rea describes the state of mind or inattention.52 
 
Proving specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt is a tall order for what normally 
could be charged as an actus reus offense, again, such as manslaughter or negligent 
homicide. In fact, along with lack of resources, etc., this “statutorily imposed” 
 
51 Department of Justice, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law: Summary of 18 U.S.C. 242, 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/deprivation-rights-under-color-law (last visited July 1, 2020) (“Section 
242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a 
person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the 
purpose of Section 242, acts under ‘color of law’ include acts not only done by federal, state, or 
local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official’s 
lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the 
performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this 
statute include police officers, prison guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as 
judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials. It is 
not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim. The offense is punishable by a range of 
imprisonment up to a life term, or the death penalty, depending upon the circumstances of the 
crime, and the resulting injury, if any.”). 
52 Paul H. Robinson, Mens Rea, 34 FAC. SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN L. 995, 995 (2002), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=faculty_scholarship 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
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requirement has presumptively stalled the prosecution of alleged state actors, 
resulting in very few cases53 being tried under § 242: 
Do all acts necessary and proper to hold the police department, officers 
responsible and others in the direct chain of command, including the local district 
attorney accountable for the unlawful deprivation of rights secured by the United 
States Constitution for unlawful acts against a person subject to the U.S. 
Constitution. Specifically, 1) Under 42 USC § 1983, eradicate the “deliberate 
indifference” standard54 for civil liability cases brought against a municipality; 2) 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, eradicate the qualified immunity protection; and 3) Under 
18 USC § 241 and 242, eradicate the specific intent or “willful” burden of proof for 
criminal cases.55 
To better understand the true gravity of this issue, consider the following 
personal narrative of an actual account, which occurred 34 years ago, given by the 
author of this paper: 
 
The year was 1984 and I was 19, an African American scholarship 
student at Howard University and a cadet in Howard's Air Force 
ROTC program. It was a cool but bright Saturday morning about 
nine am, I was traveling southbound on I-95 adjacent to the 
Pentagon and I found myself lost in the rear of a clump of cars. I 
was returning a luxury blue Buick sedan with crush blue velvet seats 
and a stereo cassette player, the latest in audio technology. This 
Buick belonged to my Uncle, an Army pilot, who allowed me to use 
it the night before for a military ball to impress my date and to travel 
a fellow cadet with his date. It was a sensational event, in fact, I 
received a cadet accolade for excellence. An absolute high point for 
me, as I was the highest ranking cadet in my class. The following 
day, I set off to return to my Uncle his Buick as promised, on time. 
With a road map folded in a tiny square held up on my steering 
wheel by my thumbs, I attempted to navigate among a morass of 
vehicles in the DC Maryland and Virginia Tristate area while 
simultaneously reading the map. Just then, I noticed a large red light 
on top of a blue Virginia State trooper's car directly behind me. 
Before I knew it, this Virginia State trooper was pulling me over. 
 
53 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Revisiting Who Is Guarding the Guardians? A Report on 
Police Practices and Civil Rights in America (Nov. 2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/249021.pdf [hereinafter Guardians]. 
54 Id. at 66. 
55 Id. at 67. 
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Surprisingly, I could not understand why I was the object of this 
trooper's intent. I wasn't traveling faster than the other cars, had not 
changed lanes, nor was I weaving in my lane, I was simply in the 
rear of the clump of cars. My only inclination was that I was being 
pulled over for inattentive driving because of my map, which I did 
not really believe to be the case. But then there was speed, all of us 
were exceeding the posted speed limit of 55 MPH by about ten 
miles, a usual rate of travel on the I-95, as most would attest. 
Certainly, speed could not have been the issue? But, unbeknownst 
to me, this trooper thought that I stole the Buick. Once pulled over, 
and over his vehicle’s PA system he shouted incredible and 
shocking accusations that I shall never forget. This Virginia State 
trooper, a presumed peace officer, shouted, "Driver get the f*%k out 
of the car, now God D**t, I don’t know if you stole that car, get out 
now God D**t." Once I got out of the car, he aggressively instructed 
me to put my hands on the hood of the car and to not move. That is 
when I noticed he had his weapon drawn and aimed at me. He then 
repeated over and over again that he did not know if I stole the car. 
He also reiterated to me to not move. An absolutely horrific setting, 
certainly shocking to anyone's consciousness; well, as you can 
imagine, I froze in place completely unable to move out of pure 
unmitigated apprehension of being killed by this Virginia State 
trooper. 
 
As the Virginia State trooper approached me, weapon still drawn, 
he viciously kicked my legs open while aggressively patting me 
down to search for weapons. I was wearing sweats and an Air Force 
unit T-shirt. Again, I did not move out of pure fear. He then 
holstered his weapon and told me to get my "f*#king Ass" in his 
cruiser and to shut the "f*#k-up." I followed his every instruction. 
At this point I was numb and simply shocked. Once in his cruiser, 
he demanded my driver license. Shaking, I handed it to him and told 
him that I never received a ticket. He called me a liar and again told 
me to "shut the f*&k up." He never asked me for proof of 
registration and insurance. After running my driver’s license, he 
seemed to have drawn down his anger a notch or two commenting 
to me that "you really never had a ticket, your record is clean???" 
He expressed shocking surprise that my record was clean and that I 
had actually told him the truth. And that is when he finally allowed 
me to speak. Gaining internal strength and moral courage to simply 
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speak for myself, I told him that I was an honor student at Howard 
University on a full trustee’s scholarship and that I was studying to 
be a pilot in the Air Force. I then told him that my Uncle, an Army 
pilot, let me use his car to take my date to our ROTC military ball 
the night before and that I had to return it to him this morning due 
to his having to fly a military mission today to New York. This 
trooper said that he did not give a "f*^k about that"; instead, he said 
that he was going to write me a ticket for reckless driving to make 
sure my "ass" comes to court. He then commented that "if I did not 
come to court, he was going to come up to Howard University and 
pull my black ass out of class and haul me into court." He also 
commented that I should feel lucky because my Uncle is a Mason, 
and that is why I was not being locked up right then and there, and 
that I should be thankful. My Uncle had a silver Masonic icon 
affixed on the rear of his car indicating his membership in the 
Masonic Lodge. I wondered however, why he insisted that I 
deserved a reckless charge when I was at the back end of a clump of 
cars simply traveling on I-95 near the Pentagon, a stretch of road 
that is most often congested and clogged with numerous vehicles.  
 
Well, with ticket in hand and body still shaking, I gingerly walked 
to my car and sat there; admittedly, I cried. After some time, and 
some mental regrouping, I somehow traveled to my Uncle's home, 
which was in the opposite direction. Frankly, I don't remember 
specifics between getting the ticket and traveling to my Uncle's home, it 
was all simply a blur, but somehow, I just got there. Interestingly, 
however, I did not tell my Uncle about this State trooper. I was too 
embarrassed and still under a high degree of shock, humiliation, and fear. 
I only told him that I got a speeding ticket and that I would handle it. 
 
About a month later, after emptying my student bank account, a sum 
of about $150, I found myself in a small courtroom in some small 
town in Virginia near the end of the Yellow Metro Line. Sitting in 
this room, I heard several defendants plead something called nolo 
contendere,56 Latin for I do not contend the charge, but I am not 
 
56 Nolo Contendere is Latin for “no contest” and “in a criminal proceeding, a defendant may enter 
a plea of nolo contendere, in which the defendant does not accept or deny responsibility for the 
charges but agrees to accept punishment. The plea differs from a guilty plea because a ‘no contest’ 
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pleading guilty. This judge allowed defendants to proceed this way 
with an explanation. After about two hours, my name was called. 
Armed with my $150, and dressed in my new penny loafers, dress 
corduroys, salmon button-down long sleeve shirt and argyle vest, I 
approached the bench and plead nolo contendere. The judge 
accepted my plea. As I began giving an explanation, I was rudely 
interrupted by the same State trooper who pulled me over. 
Surprisingly this trooper's tone and professionalism was 180 degrees 
opposite from his absurdly abusive and demining character that cool 
but bright Saturday morning. He began his comments to the Judge 
by stating that I was a fine young man and an honor student at 
Howard University. He then testified about my Uncle and that he 
had verified that I was returning his car following a military ball, all 
of which obviously fabricated and thus amounting to perjury. Once 
he ended his prevaricative diatribe, and to my surprise, he asked the 
judge to reduce the rate of speed alleged in my citation. The judge 
asked me if I was okay with a speed reduction in the citation; of 
course, I agreed. The Judge then said that my fine was only $33. A 
$33 fine from an allegation of reckless driving? How did that 
happen? Obviously pleased and vary thankful to that judge and 
trooper, I departed the courtroom with a notion that I had won 
something. I paid my fine and proceeded back to Howard 
University. 
 
The truth of the matter is that my life could have abruptly ended that 
cool but bright Saturday morning, and for only driving ten miles 
over the posted speed limit on I-95 adjacent to the Pentagon. For me, 
I lived and 12-years later, I actually served in the Pentagon as a 
Judge Advocate in the Air Force Judge Advocate General's 
Department at the rank of Captain, USAF. I had also serve two 
collateral assignments as a Special Assistant United States Attorney. 
At the Pentagon, I was the first African American in the history of 
the Air Force to serve as the Air Force Chief of JAG Accessions, a 
lawyer myself, I hired lawyers for the Air Force. However, and 
regardless of this sensational military assignment, it was indeed 
painful to me to have to drive by the very site of my horrific 
experience every day. A nightmare that played in my mine every 
 
plea cannot be used against the defendant in another cause of action.” Nolo contendere, CORNELL 
LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nolo_contendere (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
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day I arrived and departed the Pentagon, simply having to pass the 
very spot where I was pulled over on that cool but bright Saturday 
morning, that shocking morning when a sworn peace officer aimed 
his weapon at me viciously alleging without probable cause that I 
committed grand theft auto, a felony. Lastly, this Virginia State 
Trooper, a sworn officer of the peace, was African American. 
 
Unfortunately, this narrative often fails to end with the citizen being able to tell his 
or her story. All too often the end result is a summary execution under the color of 
state law with the absolute privilege of qualified immunity57 for the offending 
officer without substantial repercussions or actions amounting to justice. For 
example, consider the case of Timothy Russell and Melissa Williams in Cleveland, 
Ohio in 2012, where the subject peace officer, Officer Michael Brelo, who after a 
22-mile chase, jumped on to the hood of their car and shot 15 times directly into 
the front seat of the car striking both Mr. Russell and Ms. Williams, who were 
unarmed. The other five officers involved fired over 100 rounds, all aimed at Ms. 
Williams and Mr. Russell. Officer Brelo was the only officer tried in a court of law 
for two counts of voluntary manslaughter, and he was acquitted. Furthermore, 
although he and five other officers were terminated from the police department, 
five were later reinstated as part of an arbitration. In addition, a police supervisor 
was terminated, two supervisors were demoted, and nine other supervisors were 
suspended for 30 days.58 Fortunately, the families of Mr. Russel and Ms. Williams 
received $3M in a civil settlement, but no substantial accountability against the 
other officers, including Officer Brelo for shooting over 100 times into a car with 
two unarmed American citizens, whose apparent crime was leading a police chase 
for 22 miles. 
Usually, however, the state fails to bring charges in such situations against the 
officer or the unit or those in the officer’s chain of command or authority, including 
the District Attorney, who elects not to proceed for reasons not made public. All 
 
57 Qualified Immunity “often shields police officers and other government officials from being 
sued by victims and their families, even if the officers violated their civil rights. And since 
prosecutors are loath to file criminal charges against government agents, suing rogue officers for 
damages in civil court is often the only recourse available to victims of government abuse.” Nick 
Sibilla, New Bill Would Abolish Qualified Immunity, Make It Easier To Sue Cops Who Violate 
Civil Rights, FORBES (June 3, 2020, 2:20 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/06/03/new-bill-would-abolish-qualified-immunity-
make-it-easier-to-sue-cops-who-violate-civil-rights/#7982a4136fbc. 
58 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, 6 Cleveland Police Officers Fired for Actions in Fatal 2012 Chase, 
CNN (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/us/cleveland-police-officers-fired-
chase/index.html. 
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too often, officers are shielded, and nothing is done to deter them from committing 
the same type of offense again. Moreover, such rogue peace officers are often 
protected from accountability by their “blue line,” which then makes clear this blue 
line is worthy of indictment under 18 U.S.C § 241. Criminal offenses under the 
color of law amount to miscarriages of justice. Unfortunately, such felonious 
actions are not deterred by training59 or the suspension with pay.60 
Moreover, police unions and bargaining units usually fail to support sanctions 
such as an immediate suspension without pay for roque peace officers. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, there are no specific measures designed to deter law 
enforcement personnel from exceeding regulatory and statutory service 
expectations and committing homicide. 
In fact, direct actions against police officers, according to Michigan State Police 
Detective Lieutenant Luis Langham (retired), will meet great resistance by police 
unions. In particular, police unions carefully scrutinize any actions that will reduce 
police officers’ pay or benefits. According to a recent article in the American Bar 
Journal, July 1, 2020, police unions may inhibit proposed reform. The author, 
Stephanie Francis Ward, reports that: 
 
 
59 “Cultural awareness training and attempts to educate police officers to be more sensitive to 
different ethnic groups, races, and lifestyles, began to proliferate in the mid 1960’s and early 
1970’s during and after the strong emphasis on civil rights, particularly for those rights long 
denied African –American citizens. The usual setting for this training was a panel presentation by 
trainers(s), the vast majority being racial or ethnic minorities. The courses were typically marked 
by a strident and emotional challenge to participants which could, and often did, result in deep 
anger and resentment on the part of the participants (Work, 1989). This interest in cultural 
awareness and sensitivity training intensified after the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles in the 
early 1990’s.” Stephen M. Hennessy, Cultural Awareness Training for Police in the United States, 
PHOENIX POLICE TRAINING ACADEMY, p. 3, 
http://www2.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@civilrights/documents/webcontent/wcms1
p-149102.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
60 “These news accounts, and others from past few years, clearly reflect widespread concern with 
the processes used by police to discipline errant officers. The disciplinary process is supposed to 
help address police misconduct while supporting officers who have exercised their discretion 
appropriately and within the framework of law and policy. Unfortunately, the approaches police 
generally use fall well short of achieving their primary purpose and leave the department, 
employees and the community with concerns. There is significant dissatisfaction with the 
discipline approach; it is predominately punishment oriented, it takes an excessive amount of time, 
many decisions are overturned on appeal, and the entire process leaves one with a sense that there 
should be a better way to help officers stay within the boundaries of acceptable behavior and learn 
from the mistakes made in an increasingly difficult and challenging job.” Darrel W. Stephens, 
Police Discipline: A Case for Change, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (June 2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf. 
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The job of being a police officer comes with significant union 
protections. Work contracts often prevent municipalities from 
investigating internal discipline charges without affidavits, and it’s 
also common for the agreements to restrict access to offices’ 
employment files if they’re charged with a crime. Additionally, 
police unions and municipalities have negotiated to throw out 
misconduct complaints after a certain time period. And if an officer 
shoots someone, the contract likely gives him what’s known as a 
“cooling off” period, which prevents management from questioning 
the individual and witnessing officers about the incident within a 
certain time period, usually 48 hours. Also, some states give 
additional layers of protections for officers, with laws generally 
known as police officers’ bills of rights. In fact, few, if any unions 
have as much power in bargaining for discipline, internal 
investigation stipulations and conditions of employment as police 
do.61 
 
Thus, how is society to hold accountable rogue officers who engage in Wyatt Earp 
law enforcement, if training, suspension without pay, or other corrective actions 
can be stymied by union agreements? We suggest the answer lies in holding 
accountable those responsible for the greater enterprise, that is, the chain of 
command or authority through a § 241 prosecution. In a minority of cases, those in 
the chain of command, including police chiefs, district attorneys or mayors, 
voluntarily resign in the face of official misconduct, usually driven by political 
interests. However, these resignations are ineffective in changing attitudes and 
mindsets of officers within the subject police department. The attitudes and 
mindsets of the minority rogue “Wyatt Earp” officers remains unchanged, and the 
onslaught against American citizens while acting under the color of law continues 
unabated—and are often validated by the court. 
We have seen numerous cases where the court ratifies obvious police abuse 
against American citizens by interpreting the evidence in the best light for the police 
officer, especially in politically charged cases. Recall the 1991 Rodney King matter 
involving four peace officers who beat Mr. King after a vehicular chase in an 
exclusive part of town where African Americans seldom visit.62 The facts were 
 
61 Stephanie Francis Ward, Do police union contracts inhibit reform?, ABA JOURNAL (July 1, 
2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/does-collective-bargaining-in-police-contracts-
prohibit-police-reform. 
62 “A jury in the Los Angeles suburb of Simi Valley acquits four police officers who had been 
charged with using excessive force in arresting black motorist Rodney King a year earlier…The 
acquitted police officers were later convicted of violating Rodney King’s civil rights in a federal 
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unconvertable, as the incident was filmed. Yet, an American jury found these 
officers innocent in a criminal trial, although two were convicted in a subsequent 
federal trial. 
And what about the greater enterprise accountability? The Laquan McDonald 
case in Chicago is a prime example of a police department and district attorney 
allegedly suppressing evidence to presumptively stall charges being levied against 
former police officer Van Dyke et. al.63 
 
McDonald was shot and killed on October 20, 2014 by Chicago 
Police Department (CPD) Officer Jason Van Dyke. Responding to 
a call for backup, Van Dyke stepped out of his police cruiser, and 
prosecutors allege that seconds later, he fired sixteen shots. In a 
much later (months) publicly-released police video of the incident, 
it appears that McDonald was shot several times after he had fallen 
to the ground, where he posed no threat to the safety of the officers. 
The entire encounter was captured on police dashboard cameras 
without audio, raising questions as to “whether officers were 
careless with the recording equipment or, worse, attempting a cover-
up.”64 
 
On October 20, 2014, Laquan McDonald, a 17-year-old American citizen was 
surrounded by law enforcement on a desolate road in Chicago as he wielded a knife. 
He was no immediate threat to others. When former police officer Van Dyke 
arrived at the scene, and in a “Wyatt Earp” fashion, he fired 16 bullets into Laquan 
 
court trial [a Section 1983 case].” Rodney King Trial Verdict Announced, HISTORY (Nov. 13, 
2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/rodney-king-trial-verdict-announced. 
63 Craig Futterman, civil rights attorney and professor at University of Chicago Law School says, 
“[Systemic perjury by Chicago police] is a systematic problem. When there’s a police shooting, or 
when there’s an allegation of misconduct or brutality, the institutional response is to circle the 
wagons, denial, and cover up. And it’s throughout the entire organization. It’s not just sort of a 
code of silence [amongst officers but] really a phenomenon of narrative control and lying [from 
the top down].”). Roundup: Craig Futterman on the Laquan McDonald Shooting Video, UNIV. OF 
CHI. L. SCH. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/roundup-craig-futterman-
laquan-mcdonald-shooting-video. 
64 Donald F. Tibbs & Tyron P. Woods, Requiem for Laquan McDonald: Policing as Punishment 
and—Abolishing Reasonable Suspicion, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 763, 774-75 (2017); See also Wayne 
Drash, The Killing of Laquan McDonald: The Dashcam Video vs. Police Accounts, CNN (Dec. 19, 
2015, 12:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/us/laquan-mcdonald-video-records-
comparison/. For a summary of how CPD attempted to minimize culpability for McDonald’s 
shooting; Curtis Black, How Chicago Tried to Cover Up a Police Execution, CHI. REP. (Nov. 24, 
2015), http://chicagoreporter.com/how-chicago-tried-to-cover-up-a-police-execution/. 
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McDonald, killing him instantly. Unbeknownst to anyone at the time, Mr. 
McDonald’s killing was recorded, and the video was finally released several 
months later through a Freedom of Information Act request. The Laquan McDonald 
case amounts to manifest enterprise accountability. However, it took an election to 
remove the district attorney and the CPD Chief did not resign until three years later. 
 
II. UNDER 18 U.S.C SECTIONS 241 AND 242, ERADICATE THE SPECIFIC INTENT 
OR “WILLFUL” BURDEN OF PROOF FOR CRIMINAL CASES 
 
18 U.S.C § 241 gives the U.S. Attorney the tools to hold accountable all who are 
connected with the crime committed. Holding a person or persons accountable for 
a crime committed by the principal actor when that person aids and abets the 
principal actor is a long standing legal premise in our American jurisprudence 
system.65 In the circumstance where a peace officer allegedly commits a felony 
murder or vicious assault against a citizen—and others, with knowledge, suppress 
evidence or fail to hold the officer accountable, these “others” could be viewed or 
considered as accessories after the fact: 
 
Since the modern police organization has assumed major 
responsibility for the apprehension of criminals, prosecutions for 
misprision of felony are almost unknown. According to Blackstone, 
the crime at common law consists merely in the “concealment of a 
felony which a man knows, but never assented to; for if he assented 
this makes him either principal or accessory.” Thus a positive duty 
is placed on the citizen to reveal his knowledge of the commission 
of a crime to the proper authorities and otherwise to aid in bringing 
the felon to justice, and failure to do so constitutes the crime of 
misprision of felony. In State v. Wilson, however, it was stated that 
mere neglect to inform the proper authorities of the commission of 
a crime and the identity of the felon is not in itself an offense, but 
such conduct becomes indictable only where the failure to report is 
coupled with an “evil motive” to obstruct justice…The federal 
 
65 18 U.S.C. § 3 (West 2020). (“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has 
been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent 
his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact. Except as otherwise expressly 
provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than 
one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more 
than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the principal, or both; or if the 
principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the accessory shall be imprisoned not more 
than 15 years”). 
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criminal code declares that whoever has knowledge of a crime 
cognizable by the courts of the United States and "conceals and does 
not as soon as may be disclose" to the proper authorities shall be 
subject to fine and imprisonment. (emphasis added).66 
 
The primary issue here is whether the U.S. Attorney’s office is properly poised 
under law to take appropriate actions against those, acting under the color of state 
law, who would deny a person subject to the U.S. Constitution his civil rights. The 
fundamental problem with a § 241 action is that, similar to a § 242 action, the 
element of willfulness, or specific intent has to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Put in into perspective, imagine the difficulty an AUSA has proving that 
rogue state police officers specifically intended to deny an American citizen his 
rights under the U.S. Constitution. When a rogue police officer defends himself by 
stating that he used deadly force to protect himself or others, how does the AUSA 
overcome that defense in a § 242 action? How does the AUSA overcome that 
defense against the subject police unit in a § 241 Action? 
The AUSA has the burden of proving the charge and specification beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but specifically, under §§ 241 and 242, must prove that the peace 
officer intended to specifically and willfully violate a person’s Constitutional 
rights. The court in the 1945 case, Screws v. United States, addressed this “willful” 
standard.67 In Screws, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings, 
stating that the government’s burden was to show that the defendant “acted with a 
specific intent to deprive a person of constitutional rights or with open defiance or 
in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement.”68 Again, the Court pointed 
out the difference between a mens rea offense and an actus reus offense by stating, 
“the prosecution usually must show that the defendant intentionally performed 
some action, and the action was prohibited by law; but prosecutors ordinarily need 
not show that the defendant knew the conduct at issue was illegal or specifically 
intended to violate the law.”69 
 
This case involves a shocking and revolting episode in law 
enforcement. Petitioner Screws was sheriff of Baker County, 
Georgia…The arrest was made late at night at Hall’s home on a 
 
66 Recent Cases: Criminal Law. Accessory after the Fact. Misprision of Felony, 8 UNIV. OF CHI. L. 
REV. 338, 339 (1941), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&http
sredir=1&article=1856&context=uclrev. 
67 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
68 Lampe, supra note 9, at 3. 
69 Id. 
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warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire. Hall, a young [N]egro 
about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by [patrol] car 
to the court house. As Hall alighted from the car at the court-house 
square, the three petitioners [Screws et. al] began beating him with 
their fists and with a solid-bar blackjack about eight inches long and 
weighing two pounds. They claimed Hall had reached for a gun and 
had used insulting language as he alighted from the car. But after 
Hall, still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they 
continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty minutes until he was 
unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first through the court-
house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying. An 
ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where he 
died within the hour…There was evidence that Screws held a grudge 
against Hall and had threatened to “get” him…We do say that a 
requirement of a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right 
made definite by decision or other rule of law saves the Act from 
any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of vagueness.70 
 
Fortunately for some lower courts, Screws has not been exactly controlling. For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit “upheld a jury instruction 
stating both that ‘an act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, 
and with a specific intent to do something the law forbids,’ and that the jury could 
‘find that a defendant acted with the required specific intent even if you find that 
that he had no real familiarity with the Constitution or with the particular 
Constitutional right involved.’”71 Thus, compare the willfulness standard to the 
narrative discussed earlier involving Colonel James Durant and the Virginia State 
Trooper who had no probable cause72 to believe that the college student he pulled 
over for allegedly speeding stole the vehicle he was operating. Did the State 
Trooper “intend” to violate the college student’s Constitutional rights, specifically 
 
70 Screws, 325 U.S. at 92-93, 103. 
71 Lampe, supra note 9, at 4. 
72 “Probable cause is a requirement found in the Fourth Amendment that must usually be met 
before police make an arrest, conduct a search, or receive a warrant. Courts usually find probable 
cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been committed (for an 
arrest) or when evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for a search). Under 
exigent circumstances, probable cause can also justify a warrantless search or seizure. Persons 
arrested without a warrant are required to be brought before a competent authority shortly after the 
arrest for a prompt judicial determination of probable cause.” Probable Cause, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
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his 4th Amendment Right against unreasonable search and seizures? The Virginia 
State Trooper did have probable cause to detain the college student for speeding 
[albeit technically]; however, when the Virginia State Trooper stated several times 
that “he did not know if the college student stole the car” and accorded himself in 
a protocol akin to a felony stop, the collective or totality of circumstances, describes 
a peace officer who is following what some officers call a hunch and is departing 
from his training and policy. However, there is no mention in the 4th Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution of the term, hunch. 
In that narrative, on the issue of probable cause specifically, the state trooper 
had no reason to believe the college student was driving a stolen vehicle; so why 
did he engage in a felony stop with GUNS OUT? As such, are these facts alone 
strong enough for a § 242 case to proceed to verdict? Suppose the State Trooper 
used deadly force because the college student flinched or failed to obey a specific 
command, such as to “get out of the f*&king car.” Could an AUSA successfully 
pursue a § 242 case against the Virginia State Trooper, proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Virginia State Trooper intended to deny the college student a specific 
right under the U.S. Constitution? Again, this is a tall order and makes the burden 
of proof simply to high; and assuming somehow the AUSA can get beyond the 
specific intent element of a § 241 or 242 case, what about the lack of trial resources 
needed to successfully try the case and the political pressures opposing indictment? 
Suffice it to say, Congress’s intent in promulgating laws to strengthen the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment brings into question whether their 
specific intent is indeed viable in actions brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983, and 18 
U.S.C §§ 241 and 242. Unfortunately, the bottom line in that inquiry concerns the 
deprivation of civil rights. But perhaps now is the time to amend 42 U.S.C § 1983, 
giving plaintiffs a fair opportunity for redress against the state for wrongs 
committed by state actors acting under the color of law. And with regards to the 
U.S. Attorney’s office, and 18 U.S.C § 242 (and 241 respectively), now is the time 
to support the U.S. Attorney to proceed fairly in a criminal proceeding against a 
municipality for criminal actions without the unreasonable statutory requirement of 
mens rea, or specific intent. Perhaps narrowly defined language for a specific set 
of circumstances giving rise to such an action will provide the U.S. Attorney with 
clear authority to proceed accordingly, thus reversing the statutorily imposed 
specific intent standard. 
Thus, in the situation where an unarmed citizen, of a protected class, is killed 
or wounded by an officer acting under the color of state law where the officer 
exercised a clear abuse of discretion, three legal actions should naturally proceed: 
1) criminal charges ensuing by the cognizant state attorney, 2) a criminal case 
proceeding under 18 U.S.C §§ 242 and or 241 by the cognizant U.S. Attorney’s 
office if applicable, and 3) a civil case initiated by a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C § 
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1983. On the administrative front would follow suspension with or without pay 
along with assignment to “other duties” as appropriate. Due to iron clad bargaining 
agreements, suspension without pay oftentimes does not occur; however, 
suspension with pay occurs often. This response should be commonplace if any 
change or general deterrence is expected to ensue across the country, and if the 
United States is to begin reimaging peace officers and ensuring accountability. 
Can officers distinguish clearly between intentional and unintentional 
deprivation of a citizen’s Constitutional rights? Moreover, should the courts 
therefore be left to interpret a §§ 241 and 242 matter on the question of whether the 
subject peace officer specifically intended to deny a citizen his Constitutional 
Rights? Police training, according to Lt. Arden Bow, provides specific lessons on 
dealing with the general public. The problem, according to Lt. Bow is that once in 
a non-training environment, the officer acts with instinct along with his or her 
training. Sadly, this concept of instinct could dictate the officer’s primary actions, 
which could include justifiable homicide. 
Additionally, should the specific police unit responsible under § 241 for 
providing the environment, equipment, and training that allowed the officer to take 
the felonious actions against the citizen be held accountable? The officers in these 
circumstances, the Wyatt Earps, feel emboldened given the unlikelihood they will 
face reprisal or disciplines. 
We are at this point in American history because of the number of rogue peace 
officers who have violated their training, policy and custom, and instead execute 
law enforcement engagements with civilians based upon their own ill-conceived 
notions of grandeur, supremacy and bias—which often results in the senseless death 
of American citizens. 
So how do we best deter law enforcement officers from committing criminal 
offenses? What constitutes a sufficient deterrence, rehabilitation, punishment, extra 
training, specific deterrence, general deterrence, etc.? Retired Michigan State 
Police Lieutenant, Arden Bow believes the answer lies with the societal selection 
pool. He states that “law enforcement is a sample of the general public” and that 
the selection pool reflects societal ills. He indicated that about 60% of police 
academy cadets in Michigan graduate, but that graduation rate does not identify 
those who would engage in abusive law enforcement.73 Similarly Detective 
 
73 “The Michigan State Police started in 1917 and it wasn’t until 1967 when it hired its first officer 
of African descent. Training for racial bias is not the answer. We tried diversity training and the 
response in part is usually complaints by the officers trained and the trainees are usually African 
American. We do engage in respect training for dealing with the public, but this is different from 
use of force. Respect training involves how to speak to citizens, e.g., yes sir, yes ma’am, etc. The 
training we receive for use of force is based upon a ‘Force Continuum Graph.’ This Force 
Continuum Graph depicts when to use deadly force, i.e., when your life or the life of another is 
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Lieutenant Lewis Langham,74 another retired Michigan State Police officer, said 
that some of the officers who unlawfully kill citizens under the color of law do so 
based upon escalating circumstances that they cannot control. These escalating 
circumstances stem from the officer issuing an illegal order and the citizen knowing 
it is an illegal order and therefore choosing not to follow it. Like Lieutenant Bow, 
Detective Lieutenant Langham emphasized recruitment and hiring as a root cause, 
and that character is key. Unfortunately, as Detective Lieutenant Langham 
mentioned, local police departments do not do complete background investigations 
on new recruits, similar to the type used by the Federal government for security 
clearances. Thus, there is a definite need to conduct a sufficient background checks 
to root-out potential rogue officers.75 
 
threaten. For example, if an officer is dealing with a high risk felon, then the use of deadly force is 
an option, i.e., the ‘guns come out.’ But, if you are dealing with a simple misdemeanor, use of 
deadly force is not a reasonable option. This is the issue.” Interview with Lieutenant Arden Bow, 
supra note 38. 
74 Interview with Detective Lieutenant Lewis Langham, supra note 2. “[I]n 2007, Professor 
Langham served as deputy legal counsel and policy adviser for the office of Michigan Governor 
Jennifer M. Granholm. He assisted the governor's legal counsel on legal issues related to criminal 
justice, prisons, homeland security, and civil rights. He also served as a liaison between the 
governor and various interest groups and advised the governor on all policy or departmental issues 
related to the Michigan State Police, Department of Corrections, Homeland Security, Military & 
Veterans Affairs, and Civil Rights. Professor Langham formerly worked as an assistant public 
defender in the Washtenaw County Office of Public Defender in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He also 
worked as a solo practitioner in Southfield, Michigan, focusing on criminal defense, estate 
planning, and divorce. Before he entered the legal profession, Professor Langham was a career law 
enforcement officer. He served 25 years with the Michigan State Police, beginning as a uniformed 
road trooper and moving up through the department as a Detective Specialist in the Criminal 
Investigation Division, Narcotics Section; a Detective Sergeant, Southeastern Criminal 
Investigation Division, Diversion Unit; a Detective Lieutenant, Oakland County Narcotics 
Enforcement Team; and Detective Lieutenant, Tobacco Products Tax Fraud Team. He was also 
the liaison to the United States Secret Service where he handled Presidential and Dignitary 
Protection Detail Assignments.” W. Mich. Univ. Cooley L. Sch., 
https://www.cooley.edu/faculty/lewis-langham. 
75 Interview with Larkland Taepe, Retired Ill. Special Agent (June 2020). “Law enforcement 
officials with the Illinois State Police on average, are not the topic of sufficient background 
investigations. What is normally accomplished for the background search is a verification of 
‘references’ the law enforcement applicant puts on his/her application. A sufficient background 
investigation similar to a federal security clearance could possibly weed-out persons with 
character flaws before arming such persons with the singular authority to stop an alleged felon. 
We have a number of officers who maintain a ‘Wyatt Earp’ persona departing sufficiently from 
their training and instead going rogue. And some of these officials have character flaws that ‘in 
their minds’ justify the killing of African Americans at an alarming rate per capita, you can call 
them racists; we just can’t afford to have them on the force with a lethal weapon dealing with 
citizens; they are a danger to society, the force and themselves. A sufficient background review, 
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Clearly, a key remedy for preventing rogue officers from committing felonious 
assaults on American citizens requires turning again to enterprise accountability. 
To this end, we believe possible steps might include: 
 
• Curtailing a police department’s or district attorney’s office’s fiscal year 
budget if required to pay fines for violating citizens’ rights. 
• Amending 18 U.S.C § 241 quashing the specific intent element to give the 
U.S. Attorney a fair opportunity to represent the United States in such cases, 
thus holding the enterprise accountable. Police departments would then be 
adequately motivated to engage in, sufficient background checks that could 
help root-out potential rogue officers. 
• Imposing a substantial sentence on departmental officials of concern under 
18 U.S.C § 241 or in the case of an individual, § 242, and with the specific 
intent to deny a person’s Constitutional rights, versus a simple actus reus 
action deleted as a requirement of 18 U.S.C §§ 241/242. 
 
III. UNDER 42 USC SECTION 1983, ERADICATE THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
PROTECTION 
 
That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, local tribal, and territorial 
governments to enact legislation to eliminate or substantially curtail the defense of 
qualified immunity in civil actions brought against law enforcement officers under 
42 USC 1983 [sic] to redress deprivations of rights, privileges, and immunities 
secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United States or Territory.76 
On August 4, 2020, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates 
voted as policy on ABA Resolution 301c concerning the elimination or curtailment 
of the defense of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C 1983. This august body, 
representing over 420,000 lawyers and judges across the nation collectively said 
that Qualified Immunity needs to be eliminated or curtailed. According to the ABA:  
 
1) [Q]ualified immunity is not grounded in history or precedent, 2) 
qualified immunity [sic] has made it virtually impossible for victims 
of police brutality [sic] to recover, 3) qualified immunity [sic] 
defenses wastes scarce judicial resources, 4) qualified immunity 
 
along with a psychological inquiry could enable police departments to better discover these future 
‘rogue’ officers at the hiring process.” 
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defenses have been difficult to apply in a consistent manner, and 5) 
qualified immunity defense has left constitutional rights effectively 
un-remedied in many circumstances.77 
 
Again, refer to the college student narrative mentioned above where the Virginia 
State Trooper pulled his weapon out on then college student James Durant for a 
misdemeanor speeding violation. We know that there was probable cause to 
apprehend the college student for alleged speeding, a misdemeanor in Virginia.78 
But based upon the numerous assertions by the officer alleging that the college 
student stole the car, does that add in some way to the probable cause for a speeding 
offense? And, based upon the officer pulling out his weapon and aiming it at the 
college student, ordering the college student to “f&%king” exit the car and to place 
his body in a position to be searched, are these actions consistent with the offense 
of speeding ten miles over the posted speed limit? More importantly, is this 
Congress’s specific intent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment? 
Clearly the officer had probable cause to apprehend the college student for 
speeding, but did he go beyond his authority, after conjuring up a separate basis to 
engage in a clearly felonious stop warranting weapons out and at the ready to take 
a more intrusive search of a suspect, ultimately fabricating the facts upon which he 
was able to extend a basic search and seizure under the 4th Amendment. We know 
that the officer had no report of the vehicle being stolen; this alone is the crux of 
his excessive abusive actions. If all the officer had to legitimately form his basis for 
a search and seizure was a misdemeanor (speeding), this Virginia State Trooper 
implicitly exceeded his authority under law and arguably departed from training, 
custom and practice when he engaged the college student under his fabricated 
belief, or hunch, that the car was stolen. 
We know that for 42 U.S.C § 1983 cases, the offending officer has a judicially 
imposed defense of Qualified Immunity, which allows him or her to evade personal 
liability for violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. And we know that the crux of 
the judicially imposed standard of qualified immunity for § 1983 cases is a violation 
of a citizen’s U.S. Constitutional rights; with Qualified Immunity, the plaintiff is 
left to show using the “clearly established law” doctrine for precedent, an exact 
factual precedent, which is very difficult to prove. However, if there is no 
precedent, then the defense of Qualified Immunity may stand, thus reliving the 
officer of responsibility. And, if precedent exists, the facts have to be almost 
 
77 Id. at p. 1. 
78 Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-937. “For purposes of arrest, traffic infractions shall be treated as 
misdemeanors. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the authority and duties of arresting 
officers shall be the same for traffic infractions as for misdemeanors.” 
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identical to the U.S. Constitutional right abridged by the officer. For example, in 
Mattos v. Agarano,79 the defense of Qualified Immunity stood because the court 
could not find precedent of a U.S. Constitutional right when an officer repeatedly 
tased a pregnant woman who was 1) nonviolent, and 2) simply refused to exit her 
car for what amounted to a misdemeanor stop. Similarly, in Jessop v. City of 
Fresno,80 Qualified Immunity stood for officers who stole $225,000 from a plaintiff 
during a legitimate search based upon a warrant. The court granted the defense of 
Qualified Immunity because “the circuit had never addressed a situation involving 
theft of property seized pursuant to a search warrant by police officers.”81 Thus, in 
the case of the college honor student stopped by a Virginia State Trooper for 
traveling 10-miles faster than the posted speeding limit, in order to prevail against 
a Qualified Immunity defense, he needs to show that the officer 1) violated his U.S. 
Constitutional rights (in this case, 4th and 14th), and 2) show precedent upon which 
his facts exactly mirror a previously ruled upon case. Is this reasonable to hold the 
officer personally liable for clearly violating a citizen’s rights and departing his 
office’s training and policy? Is this Congress’s Specific Intent? 
The singular aspect of having to show clear precedent, an exact precedent, 
supports that granting the defense of Qualified Immunity for rogue peace officers 
sends the clearest message to injured potential plaintiffs that even if the state is held 
liable, the rogue peace officer will not be held accountable. In fact, according to the 
American Bar Association House of Delegates Report for Resolution 301c in the 
2020 House of Delegates meeting at the ABA 2020 Annual meeting: 
 
Police officers are virtually always indemnified. Between 2006 and 
2011, in forty-four of the country’s largest jurisdictions, officers 
financially contributed to settlement and judgments in just .41% of 
the approximately 9,225 civil rights damages actions resolved in 
plaintiffs’ favor, and their contribution amounted to just .02% of the 
over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases. 
Officers did not pay a dime of the over $3.9 million awarded in 
punitive damages.82 
 
So why would a rogue peace offer honor a citizen’s U.S. Constitutional rights when 
the courts will not hold the officer liable—and in those minority of cases when a 
 
79 661 F. 3d 433 (9th Cir 2011). 
80 936 F. 3d 937 (9th Cir. 2019). 
81 Resolution 301a, supra note 76, at 5. 
82 Id. at 15; see also Lant B. Davis, John H. Small & David J. Wohlberg, Suing the Police in 
Federal Court, 88 YALE L. J. 781, 810-12 (1979); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The 
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987). 
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rogue peace officer is held financially liable, he is often indemnified? The idea 
behind the judicially created Qualified Immunity standard had the justifiable 
purpose of not holding a public official personally liable for actions taken while 
executing their office. But this idea was premised upon the government official not 
committing crimes: 
 
Qualified immunity is a court-developed legal doctrine…[it] has 
been defended as necessary to ensure that individual government 
employees will not be subjected to potentially crushing personal 
civil liability merely for making honest mistakes or for failing to 
anticipate doctrinal developments in constitutional law.83 
 
In fact, in 1781,Congress voted into law § 1983, which states “officers who violated 
U.S. Constitutional rights were strictly liable.”84 Further, the protection indicated 
that if the defendant [officer] “acted in good faith,” he could receive the benefit of 
qualified immunity. In Pierson v. Ray,85 a group of officers received the Qualified 
Immunity protection when they arrested several African American clergymen who 
attempted to use a bus terminal that was then segregated. The officers stressed they 
were “acting in good faith” and the U.S. Supreme Court concurred with § 1983, 
stating Congress did not intend to abrogate the defense of probable cause and good 
faith.86 
However, this principle is not new or sacrosanct to police departments across 
the Union. Under U.S. Equal Employment Commission87 principles, a government 
agent found to have committed an offence, e.g., a Title VII88 protection, is not 
 
83 Resolution 301a, supra note 76, at 1; see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
84 Resolution 301a, supra note 76, at 3; see also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 
106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 58-60 (2018); Ann Woolhander, Patterns of Official Immunity and 
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 415 (1986). 
85 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
86 Id. at 555. 
87 See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2020). 
88 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964 (last visited Nov. 7, 2020). (“To 
enforce the [US] constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the 
United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to 
authorize the attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities 
and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in 
federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and 
for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
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usually held personally liable so long as he or she was acting within the scope of 
their employment. Only when he or she steps clearly outside of their office and acts 
on their own accord without out any benefit or direction of the Agency can they 
then be held liable. Similarly, in the U.S. military, a commander cannot be sued 
personally for committing a wrong. In law enforcement, due the very nature of 
engaging with citizens in potentially lethal settings, the officer needs some measure 
of assurance that he will not be held personally liable for executing the duties of his 
sworn office. This is reasonable and arguably the basis of qualified immunity. 
However, in the minority of the egregious cases, where the officer steps outside of 
his office and acts on his own accord, ultimately ending the life of an American 
citizen, should this be qualified immunity as a “get out of jail free card?” 
Similarly, the military does not have qualified immunity for its police officers, 
although they are held liable for wrongdoing. For example, with issue of civilian 
engagement during an armed conflict, the military turns to the Law of Armed 
Conflict89 (LOAC) for guiding principles and laws for personal accountability. 
LOAC is simply a collection of treaties that govern warfare to limit unnecessary 
loss of life and unnecessary loss of property. A military member who violates a 
certain treaty, such as the Geneva Convention, can be tried criminally under Article 
18 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;90 similarly, a military member can be 
disciplined administratively for a violation of LOAC. Moreover, we have witnessed 
the military holding accountable those members who violated “an enemy’s” (not a 
citizen of the United States) rights; such is the case with the 1968 Mai Lay 
Massacre,91 where Lt. William Calley was tried and convicted for killing civilians. 
And, in 2003-2006, the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, with cases involving 
military police guards who abused the “enemy” detainees;92 they too were tried in 
 
of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ‘Civil Rights Act of 
1964.’”). 
89 See Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, 2015, International and Operational Law Department, 
The Judge Advocate Genral’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army Charlottesville, Virginia, 
LCDR David Lee, JAGC, USN Editor and Contributing Author, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2015.pdf. 
90 10 U.S.C.A. § 815 (West 2020). 
91 “In response to news of the massacre, the military launched an investigation into the Charlie 
Company and their alleged actions. Lt. General W.R. Peers, who led the initial investigation, 
recommended that charges be brought against 28 officers as well as two non-commissioned 
officers involved in covering up the massacre. Charges were brought against a total of 13 officers. 
Ultimately, only one soldier, Lt. William Calley, was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.” 
Kristeen Briggs & Jonathon Figueroa, My Lai Massacre, BAYLOR (Mar. 16, 1968), 
https://blogs.baylor.edu/mylaimassacre/. 
92 “Eleven US soldiers were convicted of crimes relating to the Abu Ghraib scandal. Seven of 
those were from Maryland-based 372nd Military Police Company. A number of other service 
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a court of law (a court-martial). So, if the military will hold accountable a member 
for violating an “enemy’s” human rights, why are we grappling with police 
departments not holding peace officers accountable for violating American 
citizen’s rights? 
And, with regards to civil liability in the military, and other federal government 
entities, a person harmed by the military due to the negligence of a military member 
(civilian or active duty), can file under the Federal Tort Claims Act for redress 
against the military or government in general. However, if a military member 
exceeds his or her authority and engages in an activity not warranted or sanctioned 
by the military, he or she is opened up to civil liability from a potential plaintiff and 
does not enjoy the defense of qualified immunity. Such is the case, for example, 
when military commanders attempt to exert pressure on local business members 
who they believe breached a contract, etc. with one of the military commander’s 
troops. In that scenario, the military commander presumptively exposes herself to, 
in this case, interfering with a lawful contract between two distinct parties, the 
merchant and the customer. 
However, and more germane to the issue of abusive law enforcement, since the 
military has thousands of law enforcement officers, a deeper view of its culture is 
helpful in this analysis. Each military branch has a policing unit as a distinct part 
of its organization, and the function of this policing unit is similar, if not almost 
exactly akin to the function of peace officers. Again however, unlike civilian peace 
officers, military police do not enjoy the defense of qualified immunity. Most 
military bases, forts, posts, etc., have military housing where hundreds of military 
members and their civilian family reside. When an issue arises that involves a 
military police officer, the civilian suspect is afforded the same treatment expected 
of a non-military peace officer under the U.S. Constitution. Interestingly, however, 
the notion of military police abuse violating the U.S. Constitution is de minimis at 
best. So, why is Qualified Immunity not needed in the military? Could it be the 
security clearance background check of each military police officer to grant them a 
“secret clearance”? Could it be the intensive training, including training by military 
lawyers, or Judge Advocates? Could it be the longstanding and culturally enriched 
diversity training that all military members receive? Or could it ultimately be the 
specific and general deterrence from being prosecuted under the UCMJ, or being 
administratively discharged from the Armed Forces? In other words, military police 
officers are indeed held accountable by the law and their chain of command for 
wrongs committed. Their background checks, training and discipline are also 
 
members were not charged but reprimanded…” Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN 
WORLD, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-
facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2020). 
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important factors. So, what is the difference between criminal accountability for 
military police officers and civilian police officers? Could it all amount to 
accountability for wrongs committed? Military police commanders and First 
Sergeants universally have direct tie-ins and very close working relationships with 
the servicing Judge Advocate’s office. Thus, matters warranting judicial or 
administrative attention are expeditiously handled. And since there are no 
bargaining units in the military, time spent on infractions are expeditiously 
managed. However, for small and large (felonious) matters, members of the 
military enjoy free representation by a defense lawyer for any offense alleged, be it 
judicial or administrative. And with all elements of administrative actions, or 
judicial punishments, a military member’s due process rights are inherent, implicit, 
and respected. 
The truth of the matter is that military police officers are not known for abuse 
of discretion while engaging with civilians for alleged crimes committed. But again, 
why do military police not have the defense of Qualified Immunity when they 
engage with civilians for matters ranging from infractions to misdemeanor to 
felonies, which are prosecuted by Special Assistant United States Attorneys in U.S. 
Federal Magistrate Court.93 This difference is worthy of further study. Military 
police on a given post, fort, or base specifically and routinely engage in domestic 
matters, assaults, drunk and disorderly conduct, etc., but rarely is it alleged or 
reported that a military police officer has abused his or her discretion by denying a 
suspect his or her civil rights under the U.S. Constitution. In a recent interview, 
Brigadier General Jimmy E. McMillian, USAF Retired, former Director of the Air 
Force Security Forces world-wide commanding over 30,000 military police 
officers, said: 
 
Military members do not need qualified immunity, it is not required 
based upon the lack of cases and upon the systems in place to govern 
the military police member’s actions in the execution of law 
 
93 “Magistrate judges serve as judicial officers of the U.S. district courts and exercise the 
jurisdiction delegated to them by law and assigned by the district judges. Magistrate judges may 
be authorized to preside in almost every type of federal trial proceeding except for felony cases.” 
Federal Judicial Center, Magistrate Judgeships, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/magistrate-
judgeships (last visited Sept. 2020); see also Sgt. Thomas Hamilton, What is Federal Magistrate 
Court?, GOODFELLOW AIR FORCE BASE (Apr. 27, 2009), 
https://www.goodfellow.af.mil/Newsroom/Features/Display/Article/375655/what-is-federal-
magistrates-court/ (“So few military members deal with Federal Magistrate's Court that most do 
not know it exists. However, with many civilians working on or visiting military installations, 
there must be a forum in order to deal with criminal acts they commit. That is what Magistrate's 
Court is for. If you are a civilian, have a civilian spouse or have civilian friends, you should 
understand Federal Magistrate's Court.”). 
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enforcement. And it is simply not the culture of the Air Force to 
shield a member from his/her responsibility for doing wrong. 
Holding Air Force Security Force members accountable is a huge 
distinction between how we manage our military police for 
engaging in misconduct and how civilian units across the country 
manage their peace officers. Our military police follow the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice where the local commander has courts-
martial authority; this too is a big difference, but it goes to the issue 
of accountability by the local leadership and sends the clearest 
message to military police that they will be held accountable for 
misconduct. And, military police commanders deal with matters 
expeditiously with the help of their local prosecutors, the judge 
advocates. Another difference is Internal Affairs, the Air Force 
Security Forces do not have Internal Affairs; we do however work 
with the Office of Special Investigations, which falls under the Air 
Force Inspector General’s office to conduct investigations into 
certain allegations of misconduct within local Security Forces units. 
What I’ve seen too with civilian units is that the Internal Affairs 
personnel are bound by union agreements and other ties to the local 
police chief who is also bound by union agreements, this is on par 
with qualified immunity. That is not the same in the Air Force. 
Further, another key difference is our diversity and diversity 
training. When you look at a local police unit, many of the officers 
are from the local area, went to the same high schools in many cases 
and were not exposed to too much outside of their local community. 
Yet, in the Air Force, we have vast diversity on different levels and 
most, if not all, of the Security Forces Airmen assigned to a 
particular unit are from locations different locations other than their 
present assignment. They have lived, engaged, and worked with 
people of various races, religions, and backgrounds; in essence, their 
first encounter with a person of African American descent is not met 
with apprehension or fear or bias. Another difference concerns the 
levels of authority or chain of command. The levels are smaller in 
the Air Force than in civilian police units; in many cases, an Air 
Force patrol officer has probably three to four levels of authority 
before reaching his or her local commander. This adds to the tight 
accountability and control. And again, we don’t get the need for 
qualified immunity because the actions required for qualified 
immunity are almost non-existent in the Air Force due to training 
and accountability. Another difference is our close working 
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relationship with the Air Force JAGs who provide advice on 
virtually all search and seizure cases. Our cops are able to reach a 
judge advocate at any hour of the day or night to get search authority 
through the Mission Support Commander, who normally serves as 
the military magistrate. This too lends to the fact that many of our 
cases do not amount to a denial of Forth Amendment protections 
because the arresting Security Forces members act along a chain of 
direction and authority. Lastly, as I’m sure it is the same with 
civilian units, the Air Force has a force escalation model that dictates 
when weapons come out, and our specific training requires the 
officer to de-escalate the situation. That combined with their Law of 
Armed Conflict training and their Rules of Engagement orders 
dictate how and when they respond to a threat. Our officers deal with 
DUIs, larceny, assaults, burglary, distribution of narcotics, etc. Yet, 
in my 30 years as an Air Force Security Police Officer, latter 
Security Forces Officer, up to commander over all Air Force 
Security Forces (approximately 35,000), I have only seen a handful 
of cases whereby the Security Forces Airman denied a person his or 
her civil rights; but in each of those cases, the Security Forces 
Airman was disciplined and indeed held accountable.94 
 
 
94 Interview with Brigadier General Jimmy E. McMillian, USAF Retired (Aug. 10, 2020). (“Brig. 
Gen. Jimmy E. McMillian [was] the Director of Security Forces, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He 
[was] the focal point for ensuring the physical security of nuclear assets within the Air Force and 
planning and programming for more than 30,000 active-duty and Reserve components' security 
forces at locations worldwide. He provide[d] policy and oversight for protecting Air Force 
resources from terrorism, criminal acts, sabotage and acts of war, and he ensures Security Forces 
are trained, equipped and ready to support contingency and exercise plans. General McMillian 
earned his commission after graduating from the ROTC program at North Carolina Agriculture 
and Technical State University in 1981. During his career, he has served in a variety of security 
forces operations and instructor assignments in Montana, Texas, New Jersey, Nevada, North 
Dakota Turkey and Washington, D.C. He has also served in major command headquarters 
positions at Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command and Air Force Space Command. He 
has commanded at the squadron, group, and wing levels.” U.S. Air Force, 
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/108451/brigadier-general-jimmy-e-
mcmillian/. General MacMillian is currently a member of the Senior Executive Service serving as 
Assistant Manager for Infrastructure and Environmental Stewardship for the U.S. Department of 
Energy-Savannah River. Comments from General MacMillian are personal and do not reflect the 
policies or opinions of the U.S. Department of Energy or the US Department of the Air Force. 
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Similar to General McMillian, whose perspective is that of a Commissioned 
Officer, Chief Master Sergeant Brian S. Cain,95 United States Air Force Retired, a 
former Security Forces [police] officer, offered his perspective on why military 
police do not require or need Qualified Immunity. As a Security Forces leader who 
Enlisted and started as an Airman Basic and rose to the top 1% of Enlisted members 
in the Air Force, Chief Master Sergeant Cain emphasized accountability as one of 
the primary reasons for not having qualified immunity. He pointed out 1) the 
smaller chain of command in the military and how the unit commander is intimately 
familiar with troops under his/her command; 2) differences in standards of 
discipline and use of force training; 3) background checks, as did General 
McMillian, emphasizing that Security Forces Airman have to have at least a Secret 
Clearance; some, according to General McMillian, have to have Top Secret security 
clearances and higher, depending on the job they are assigned by “higher 
headquarters.” 
Thus, the concept of Qualified Immunity in the military for its police is not 
necessary as military training, tight management and control are sufficient to thwart 
or reduce drastically incidences in which civilians are denied their U.S. 
Constitutional rights. However, this is not to argue that a military model of law 
enforcement is recommended. As retired Illinois Special Agent Larkand Taepe 
stated in his interview: 
 
Military members are trained to kill, civilian law enforcement is 
trained to stop, but with “Wyatt Earp” types of police officers, the 
rogue peace officers, they are bent on killing as a first option. But, 
from the singular standpoint of following the military model for 
accountability, ABSOLUTELY! The states need to take note of the 
military law enforcement hiring, training and accountability, with 
hopes of replicating in part this successful model for reducing and 
controlling the number of rogue peace officers and those who follow 
and condone the actions of the rogue peace officer if we as a nation 
 
95 Interview with Chief Master Sergeant Brian S. Cain, USAF Retired (Aug. 12, 2020). Chief 
Master Sergeant Cain served in the United States Air Force for 24 years as an Air Force Security 
Forces Officer. His education background includes an AA (Community College of the Air Force) 
in criminal justice, a BS (University of Phoenix) in Management, and an MBA (Trident 
University). During his 24 years of service, he was a Security Forces Patrol Leader, Flight Chief, 
Operations Superintendent, Squadron Superintendent and Superintendent of Security and Policing 
for 30,000 visiting US Forces station in the United Kingdom Chief Cain said, I supervised over 
1,200 Air Force Security Forces police officers during my Air Force Career; See also Air Force 
Instruction 31-118, Air Force Security Forces Standards and Procedures (Aug. 8, 2020), 
https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a4/publication/afi31-118/afi31-118.pdf. 
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are ever to truly arrive at a substantive reimagining of the American 
state peace officer.96 
 
Additionally, the late Attorney Johnnie Cochran Jr. stated in his 1996 publication, 
Journey to Justice, “militarization was good as far as the white majority was 
concerned.”97 Military influence on civilian police units “militarize” civilian police 
units creating distinct circles; the epitome of a “we and them” concept of law 
enforcement operations; an “enemy” type of thinking vice to protect and serve a 
civilian population; an occupational force vice the original meaning of an officer of 
the peace; the Norman Rockwell98 image: 
 
Most people also welcomed the increasing militarization of the 
[police] force, particularly its growing reliance on widely scattered 
automobile patrol units that further isolated officers from the 
communities they policed. Militarization was good, as far as the 
white majority was concerned, because it kept the police out of sight 
until you called them and then they came pretty quickly. More 
important, it allowed Los Angeles to police its vast area with very 
few officers, which meant very cheaply. Latinos and African 
Americans took a different view of this process since they were 
treated differently by the reformed police department from the start. 
Johnnie L. Cochran Jr.99 
 
And, on this point, General McMillian mentioned that civilian police units focus 
resources and efforts in certain parts of communities where racial minorities 
dominate.100 Similarly, Attorney Cochran, in his publication Journey to Justice, 




96 Interview with Larkland Taepe, supra note 75. 
97 Johnnie L. Cochran, Journey to Justice 77 (1997). 
98 “The Massachusetts trooper depicted sitting at a diner with a young boy [Caucasian] in Norman 
Rockwell’s iconic painting, ‘The Runaway,’ died on Sunday at 83. Richard Clemens was a 29-
year-old trooper when Rockwell asked him to pose for the painting…I don't think Rockwell could 
have chosen a more appropriate model, said Mary Blaauboer. It's a symbol of police officers and 
how they help people. But it symbolized my father as a person, too. It showed his heart, and his 
whole life.” POL Staff, Mass. Trooper in Norman Rockwell Painting Dies, POLICE MAG. (May 8, 
2012), https://www.policemag.com/349993/mass-trooper-in-norman-rockwell-painting-dies  
99 Cochran, supra note 97, at 77. 
100 Interview with Brigadier General Jimmy E. McMillian, supra note 94. 
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A ridged former military officer named William Parker, who 
believed that the best way to ensure an honest police force was to 
people its ranks with former Soldiers and Marines with no personal 
ties to the community. He purposefully recruited new officers from 
among discharged young servicemen in the South and Midwest, and 
they brought with them not only the racial prejudices common to 
their regions at the time but also deeply rooted Bible-Belt notions of 
public rectitude.101 
 
Thus, although there are insights to be gained by understanding the operational 
controls the military has over its police forces, applying military operational 
thinking to civilian interactions with police presents certain dangers. Citizens are 
not enemies: they are members of the Republic who pay peace officers’ salaries 
and fund their resources and more importantly, they are the object of the phrase 
protect and serve. The duty of a peace officer is to protect and serve, period. What 
General McMillian posits is consistent with that philosophy, i.e., the consistent 
accountability practices of the military police forces against the minority of rogue 
officers who, on their own volition, deny citizens their civil rights; this 
accountability clearly supports the absence of or need for Qualified Immunity in 
the military. 
In sum, and for the reasons articulated herein, we recommend abolishing the 
judicially created defense of Qualified Immunity across the Union—as Colorado 
did on June 19, 2020 through its Enhanced Law Enforcement Integrity Act.102 In 
the Colorado Revised Statutes, it states: 
 
13-21-131. Civil action for deprivation of rights - definition. 
 
(1) A peace officer, as defined in section 24-31-901 (3), employed 
by a local government who, under color of law, subjects or 
causes to be subjected, including failing to intervene, any other 
person to the deprivation of any individual rights that create 
binding obligations on government actors secured by the bill of 
rights, article ii of the state constitution, is liable to the injured 
party for legal or equitable relief or any other appropriate relief. 
 
(2) (a) statutory immunities and statutory limitations on liability, 
damages, or attorney fees do not apply to claims brought 
 
101 Cochran, supra note 97, at 78. 
102 S.B. 20-217, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020). 
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pursuant to this section. The “Colorado Governmental Immunity 
Act,” article 10 of title 24, does not apply to claims brought 
pursuant to this section. 
 
(b) qualified immunity is not a defense to liability pursuant 
to this section. (emphasis added).103 
 
Each state in the Union should swiftly enact legislation to hold rogue peace officers 
accountable for their actions and nullify the use of Qualified Immunity; at the 
federal level, we recommend amending § 1983 to abolish the defense of qualified 
immunity. On June 3, 2020, Senators Kamala Harris104, Edward Markey, and Cory 
Booker introduced such a Bill in the U.S. Senate calling for the abolishment of the 
Qualified Immunity defense in § 1983 cases: 
 
“Law enforcement should not be completely shielded from 
accountability when they violate someone’s civil rights,” said 
Senator Harris. “It is clear that the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity doctrine is broken and in need of reform. It is time that we 
say clearly that police officers should be held accountable to the law 
and to the people they are sworn to protect, period.”  
 
“In our culture of systemic racism, qualified immunity is one of the 
foremost tools of oppression,” said Senator Markey. “We cannot 
wait on the Court to fix its mistake. Police officers are murdering 
black and brown Americans in our streets without any 
accountability. We must act now and end qualified immunity once 
and for all. I thank Senators Booker and Harris for their partnership 
on this important resolution.”  
 
“For too long our courts have closed their doors to people seeking 
redress when police violate their constitutional rights,” said Senator 
Booker. “We’ve got to ensure that there is access to justice to truly 
hold police accountable for their misconduct. This resolution is just 
the first step of moving forward to ensure people can use our courts 
to achieve the justice they deserve.” 
 
103 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-131. 
104 Following the Jan. 20, 2021, swearing in ceremony, Senator Kamala Harris should be referred 
to as Vice President Kamala Harris. 
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“The American people are sick and tired of police abuse without 
consequences,” said Senator Sanders. “Congress must end 
‘qualified immunity’ now so that police can be held accountable for 
wrongdoing, just like everybody else. I am proud to be joining 
Senators Markey, Harris and Booker in advancing a resolution that 
calls for precisely that.”  
 
“George Floyd, Eric Garner, Breonna Taylor and countless other 
unarmed Black Americans whose names we do not know have been 
killed at the hands of police officers,” said Senator Warren. “We 
need to fundamentally reform policing in America, and that must 
begin with real accountability for law enforcement officers 
responsible for unjustified killings of Black men and women. That’s 
why Congress must end qualified immunity for police officers and 
departments that violate Americans’ constitutional rights.”105 
 
Similarly, sponsored by U.S. Representative Karen Bass (D CA), in June 2020, the 
U.S. House of Representatives passed the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 
2020, H.R. 7120. It is now with the Senate for action, and the White House has 
already published its position on H.R. 7220: 
 
The [Trump] Administration opposes House passage of H.R. 7120, 
the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020. This overbroad 
bill would deter good people from pursuing careers in law 
enforcement, weaken the ability of law enforcement agencies to 
reduce crime and keep our communities safe, and fail to bring law 
enforcement and the communities they serve closer together. The 
Administration favors a targeted approach that will improve the 
quality of police services provided to every American community, 
 
105 Harris, Markey, Booker Introduce Senate Resolution to Abolish Qualified Immunity for Law 
Enforcement, Hold Officers Accountable for Police Brutality, KAMALA D. HARRIS U.S. SENATOR 





courts; see also S. Res 602, 116th Cong. (2020). 
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instead of using an excessive approach such as the one taken by H.R. 
7120.106 
 
Similar to Colorado’s Enhanced Law Enforcement Integrity ACT,[SB 20-217], 
H.R. 7120 provides the essence of reimagining peace officers, and among other 
sweeping changes, this legislation seeks to lower the criminal intent standard in 
criminal prosecutions against peace officers from the high standard of “willful,” to 
a lesser burden of “knowing or reckless.” It also provides a limit on the defense of 
Qualified Immunity in § 1983 cases against peace officers, etc.107 
However, simply striking away Qualified Immunity will not be sufficient; other 
actions, such as those detailed in Colorado’s Enhanced law Enforcement Integrity 
Act108, provide a good start. Legislators should focus on a 360 degree approach to 
re-image the concept of a peace officer. In addition to abolishing the § 1983 of the 
Qualified Immunity defense, other measures are required, including enhanced 
hiring practices with substantive background searches and polygraphs, mental 
evaluations, frequent diversity and inclusion training in all training, tighter 
supervisory or command chains, close working relationships with criminal 
prosecutors to advise on a moment’s notice and non-threatening community 
engagements for areas patrolled, i.e., the peace officer must know the community 
and its people where they patrol.109 
 
106 See Statement of Administrative Policy: H.R. 7120- George Floyd Justice in policing Act of 
2020, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (June 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/SAP_HR-7120.pdf. 
107 “On June 25, 2020, the U.S. House of Representative strongly supported H.R. 7120, the 
‘George Floyd Justice in Policing Act.’ This comprehensive bill passed by a margin of 236 years 
to 181 nays and has been sent to the US Senate for consideration. Among other things, the 
legislation holds all law enforcement officials accountable for their actions, ends ‘qualified 
immunity’ for police officers, ends racial and religious profiling, empowers our communities, 
establishes uniform policies for the use of force, mandates data collection on police encounters, 
bans chokeholds and ‘no knock’ warrants, limits military equipment on American streets, requires 
body-worn cameras and classifies lynching as a hate crime, therefore making it open to Federal 
resources for investigations and prosecutions.” H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020); See also George 
Floyd Justice In Policing Act Passes The Us House, NAACP, (June 2020) 
https://www.naacp.org/latest/george-floyd-justice-policing-act-passes-u-s-house. 
108 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-217 (West 2020). 
109 Operation Full Stride, Metropolitan Police Washington DC, Engaging the Community One 
Step at a Time (2020), 
https://octo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/OFS_brochure.pdf. 
(“In an effort to increase our community- police interaction, crime prevention, and visibility in all 
of the city’s neighborhoods, the Metropolitan Police Department is re-introducing an age-old 
tactic, the footbeat. Operation Full Stride will add foot patrols to all seven police districts to 
encourage interaction between the people who are sworn to protect the city and the people they 
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IV. UNDER 42 USC 1983, ERADICATE THE “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
STANDARD”110 FOR CIVIL LIABILITY CASES BROUGHT  
AGAINST A MUNICIPALITY 
 
When an official acting under the color of law recklessly and consciously ignores 
the consequences of his actions, this amounts to the legal premise of “Deliberate 
Indifference,” which, in a § 1983 case against a municipality, has to be proven by 
the plaintiff by a preponderance of evidence; this task has stalled many civil cases 
under § 1983 from exacting accountabilities of wrongs from municipalities. Unlike 
negligence, e.g., duty, breach, proximate cause and damages, deliberate 
indifference falls somewhere between negligence and intentional actions (torts) to 
cause harm against a person: Deliberate indifference “is defined as requiring (1) an 
‘aware[ness] of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 
risk of serious harm exists’ and (2) the actual ‘drawing of the inference.”111 
Again, overcoming Deliberate Indifference is a tall task, as a plaintiff must 
show by a preponderance of evidence that the municipality failed to train [its 
officers] adequately, and that this failure was a conscious act of the municipality.112 
In order for a plaintiff to succeed in a § 1983 case for liability against a 
municipality, he must prove that “the particular policy or custom of the 
municipality that caused the injury was so inadequate that it amounts to ‘deliberate 
indifference’ to the rights of persons whom the police come in contact.”113 
For example, in City of Canton v. Harris, the Court stated that the municipality 
must be found to have made a conscious and deliberate decision to fail to provide 
an adequate training program.114 Harris involved a Mrs. Geraldine Harris, who in 
1978 was arrested for a misdemeanor driving offense. She was transported to the 
Canton Police Department station and was found on the floor of the police vehicle 
 
serve. This program is intended to help you get to know the footbeat officers and the leadership 
team — the sergeants and lieutenants — in your police service area (PSA) so you can call on them 
in a time of need or whenever you have questions about police service in your neighborhood. So 
join us as we make strides to serve you better and help us to prevent and solve crimes in the 
Nation’s Capital.”). 
110 Guardians, supra note 53. 
111 Elliott v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91125, *14 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009). 
112 Guardians, supra note 53; see also Kevin R. Vodak, A Plainly Obvious Need for New-
Fashioned Municiapal Liability: The Deliberate Indifference Standard and Board of County 
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 785 (1999). 
113 Guardians, supra note 53. 
114 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (“…there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a 
‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983…We hold today that the inadequacy of 
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”). 
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that transported her. Officers asked her if she needed medical attention and she 
responded incoherently, and no medical treatment was rendered. Once inside the 
police station, she fell to the ground twice; the second time she fell, officers just 
left her on the floor assuming that she would be safer simply on the floor, and again, 
no medical attention was rendered. After being released, her family immediately 
transported her to a hospital, and she was given proper emergent medical attention. 
Mrs. Canton filed a § 1983 case in Federal District Court alleging, among other 
wrongs, that she was denied protection under the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because she did not receive medical attention. 
Thus, the obvious question in these cases turns on whether the officers’ training 
should have led them to get Mrs. Canton medical attention. 
The Court (a jury) granted her relief citing a Canton City regulation that gave 
police shift commanders discretion (assuming with no previous training) on 
providing medical assistance to detainees. The 6th Circuit Court affirmed the 
decision that liability attaches if a municipality is shown to have acted “recklessly, 
intentionally, or with gross negligence, and that the lack of training was so reckless 
or grossly negligent that deprivation of persons’ constitutional rights was 
substantially certain to result.”115 However, the Court of Appeals ultimately 
reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.116 In a similar case involving 
deliberate indifference, the court reasoned that only when a failure to train amounts 
to a deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does liability for 
failure to train serve as a basis for liability under § 1983.117 Of note, just four years 
earlier from Canton (1989), in 1985, the Court ruled that one incident of excessive 
force does not in and of itself amount to a sustainable allegation of failure to train.118 
 
115 Id. at 382; see also Johnn K. Murphy, Can “Failure to Train” Lead to Litigation?, HGExperts, 
https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witness-articles/can-failure-to-train-lead-to-litigation-22012 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
116 Harris, 489 U.S. at 383; see also UMKC: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT, 
https://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/CantonDocs/CantonMainPage.htm (last visited No. 8, 
2020) (“On the other hand, although the jury awarded her a $200,000 verdict against the city, it 
denied her any recovery against any of the individual officers thus implicitly rejecting some of her 
testimony…and more than ten years after her arrest, the Supreme Court overturned her verdict 
against the City. By that time, Ms. Harris was suffering from cancer and no retrial ever occurred. 
She died in July of 1991.”). 
117 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also David Achtenberg, 
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik 485 U.S. 112 (1987), 
https://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/praprotnik/praprotnikmainpage.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 
2020) (“An unconstitutional action by an official whose decisions are subject to review cannot be 
treated as a final policy unless the reviewing body approves both the decision and its 
unconstitutional basis.”). 
118 Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). With an even more narrow scope, the U.S. Supreme 
Court limited municipal liability for single offenses by its officers. In Tuttle, the plaintiff was shot 
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And, in 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the only situation in which the need 
for training has been deemed “obvious” is in the use of firearms.119 “Before a 
municipality can be liable, a plaintiff in a § 1983 claim now must prove that an 
officer committed a felony or show evidence that the officer had a history of 
continual use of excessive force.”120 
 
We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as 
the basis for 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police 
came into contact…Only where a municipality's failure to train its 
employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' 
to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly 
thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under 
1983…Only where a failure to train reflects a 'deliberate' or 
'conscious' choice by a municipality – a 'policy' as defined by our 
prior cases – can a city be liable for such a failure under 1983.121 
 
Additionally, the Court addressed the issue of negligent hiring in Brown v. Bryan 
County.122 In Brown, Deputy Burns applied excessive force against the Plaintiff, 
Mrs. Jill Brown as he attempted to pull her out of a car. Mrs. Brown was not armed, 
nor had she committed any crimes. As a result of the force applied to Mrs. Brown, 
she sustained knee injuries requiring surgery. Ms. Brown brought suit under § 1983 
for negligent hiring and excessive force. When Deputy Burns first applied to the 
Brian County Sherriff’s Department to be a deputy sheriff, he had a warrant for his 
arrest and a criminal record that included driving while intoxicated, nine (9) moving 
traffic violations, a probation violation, assault and battery, public drunkenness, 
resisting arrest and driving while on a suspended driving license, yet he was hired 
to serve as a peace officer. As Michigan State Police Officer Lt. Arden Bow 
detailed, hiring is one of the issues that need correction. And certainly, as Gen 
Jimmy McMillan stated, the Air Force does extensive background checks on its 
security police. Sherriff Moore did neither, and in fact, Deputy Sherriff Burns was 
 
by a peace officer when he failed to “halt” in his bodily movements and instead attempted to reach 
down towards his boots. A 1983 action ensued, and a jury awarded his widow $1,500,000. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed. 
119 Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); see also Gold v. City of Miami, 151 
F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998) 
120 Guardians, supra note 53, at 66. 
121 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989). 
122 67 F.3d 1174 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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a relative of Sherriff Moore. The District Court and Court of Appeals found for 
Mrs. Brown on both the excessive force allegation and the county’s hiring practices 
allegation.123 
However, on review to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court vacated the District 
Court of Appeals stating that Mrs. Brown failed to show a “conscious disregard for 
a high risk that [deputy sheriff] Burns would use excessive force in violation of 
Mrs. Brown’s federally protected rights.”124 Moreover, the court stated that only if 
a reasonable policy maker, who after examining an applicant’s background could 
perceive the “plainly obvious consequence” that a deprivation of federal rights 
could occur if that person is hired, that a single hiring decision could constitute a 
municipal policy.125 However, it took Justice O'Connor to correctly sum up the 
question of municipal liability for hiring, which is a purely ministerial and policy 
driven function of police Departments. 
Similarly, as Retired General McMillian summed up hiring necessities for law 
enforcement officers in the military, “extensive background searches are a part of 
the hiring process” (albeit for security clearances for classified access); and as 
Retired Illinois Special Agent Larkland Taepe also summed up hiring practices for 
the Illinois State Police, “there is a need to delve further into a potential new Illinois 
State Police officer’s background beyond just speaking to the references he or she 
provided.” Both retired law enforcement officers from two perspectives clearly 
articulate the need for careful hiring of law enforcement officers. Looking purely 
into the issue negligent hiring, the case law is clear. However, the basis courts have 
relied upon to deny relief for negligent hiring theories of law have been usually 
couched under a respondeat superior basis. 
Take for example, Piotrowski v. City of Houston.126 Here we see again that the 
bar for liability against a municipality is set high. The court held that a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claim under the theory of respondeat superior is not available against a 
 
123 Id. at 1185; see also Vodak, supra note 112, at 805 (“The jury found Burns liable for applying 
excessive force and the county's hiring and training policies ‘so inadequate as to amount to 
deliberate indifference’ of Brown's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court addressed only the 
claim based on Sheriff Moore's hiring decision.”). 
124 Brown, 520 U.S. at 415. 
125 See generally id. 
126 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Municipal liability for section 1983 violations results if a 
deprivation of constitutional rights was inflicted pursuant to official custom or policy. Official 
policy is ordinarily contained in duly promulgated policy statements, ordinances or regulations. 
But a policy may also be evidenced by custom, that is: (2). . . .  a persistent, widespread practice of 
City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated 
policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal 
policy…Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable 
under section 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined”). 
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municipality. Moreover, even an unconstitutional act committed by a municipality 
is unlikely where the act is isolated.127 
In Piotrowski, the plaintiff sued the city of Houston for attempted murder when 
her friend, a peace officer in an off-duty status, attempted to kill her, rendering her 
a paraplegic and for the numerous other city officials who allegedly covered up the 
matter.128 The defendant, City of Houston, denied that any existing “custom or 
policy” resulted in Mrs. Piotrowski being shot. Instead, they posited that the cause 
of her injuries is because of “the misconduct of rogue [peace] officers.”129 Ms. 
Piotrowski was initially awarded $26 million, but the case was reversed on appeal. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals did not find “municipal liability or liability based on a 
state-created danger theory.”130 The Court delineated what constitutes municipal 
liability: “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, municipal 
liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official 
policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy 
or custom.”131 
And under Wahab v. City of New York, “[m]unicipal liability for civil rights 
violations can also result from either a municipally endorsed policy, or a custom or 
practice that is so widespread the municipality had actual or constructive 
knowledge of it.”132 Additionally, the Court said that “the unconstitutional conduct 
must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action 
or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will 
almost never trigger liability.”133 
In sum, in Piotrowski, since the court could not find a policy or custom for 
police abuse based upon the facts presented by Mrs. Piotrowski, the City of Houston 
ultimately evaded municipal liability. The Court in Piotrowski said: “Isolated 
violations are not the persistent, often repeated, constant violations, that constitute 
custom and policy as required for municipal § 1983 liability...A customary 
municipal policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from single constitutional 
violations.”134 
Additionally, the court’s rationale for failing to levy municipal liability was that 
the peace officer was in an off duty status and “moonlighting.” Although 
 
127 Id. at 578. 
128 Id. at 572. 
129 Id. at 580. 
130 Id. at 583. 
131 Id. at 578. 
132 386 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
133 Piotrowski, 237 F. 3d at 578 (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1984)). 
134 Id. at 581. 
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“moonlighting” was a policy approved by the Houston Police Department, the 
Court could not link this policy with Mrs. Houston’s attempted murder. 
In comparing to Piotrowski to City of Los Angeles v. Heller,135 which involved 
an on-duty officer acting under the color of law, the Court found no municipal 
liability for clear police abuse based upon a lack of “infliction of Constitutional 
harm.” In Heller, the Respondent was assaulted by police officers following a 
presumed driving while intoxicated stop that resulted in his falling through a 
window. The Respondent was not under the influence. The Respondent filed a § 
1983 action for a non-probable cause stop and for excessive force and lost at the 
District Court level. The jury was not instructed on any affirmative defenses for the 
officer and returned a verdict for the officer. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
ruling related to the City of Los Angeles, but not the officer. The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the jury’s finding of no 
constitutional injury was conclusive against the officer and the City of Los 
Angles.136 
  
But this was an action for damages, and [none of our cases] 
authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation 
based on the actions of one of its officers when, in fact, the jury has 
concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. If a 
person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the 
individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations 
might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is 
quite beside the point.137 
 
In the dissent, Justice Stevens and Justice Marshal reasoned that the Petitioner 
contended that Los Angeles condoned a policy of excessive force in making arrests, 
and that the actions of the police using “clear excessive violence” violated his 
constitutional rights: 
 
Thus, despite the majority's summary assertion to the contrary, it is 
perfectly obvious that the general verdict rejecting the excessive 
force claim against Officer Bushey did not necessarily determine the 
constitutionality of the city's “escalating force” policy – a subject on 
which the jury had received no instructions at all. The verdict merely 
determined that the officer's action was not unreasonable “in the 
 
135 475 U.S. 796 (1986). 
136 Id. at 799. 
137 Id. 
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light of all the surrounding circumstances” – which, of course, 
included the evidence that Officer Bushey was merely obeying 
orders and following established Police Department policy…The 
Court today reverses an interlocutory decision in a constitutional 
rights case on the basis of assumptions that dramatically conflict 
with the record and with settled legal principles. The Court 
mistakenly assumes that there was a necessary inconsistency 
between the verdict of no liability against the individual officer and 
a possible verdict against the municipal defendants; it then 
mistakenly assumes that dismissal was an appropriate response to 
the perceived inconsistency. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Court 
achieves these results without the aid of briefs or argument, and 
relies on an anonymous author to explain what it has done.138 
 
These cases and others demonstrate a marked departure from Congress’s legislative 
intent for holding a municipality liable. The precedent speaks for itself.  
• Canton: To find against the municipality, the municipality has to have made 
a conscious and deliberate decision to not have a training program;139  
• Jones: Deliberate indifference “is defined as requiring (1) an ‘awareness of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists’ and (2) the actual ‘drawing of the inference’”;140 
• Brown: For a municipality to be held liable, a plaintiff in a § 1983 claim 
must prove a felony was committed by that officer or provide evidence of 
the officer’s history and continued use of excessive force.141 
• Praprotnik: “An unconstitutional action by an official whose decisions are 
subject to review cannot be treated as a final policy unless the reviewing 
body approves both the decision and its unconstitutional basis”’142 
• Bennett: Unconstitutional actions must be directly attributable to an official 
action or imprimatur of the municipality, and even so, if an action is 
unconstitutional but isolated, it is highly unlikely to trigger liability.143 
There are, of course, many others to add to this list. Is this Congress’s Legislative 
Specific Intent for § 1983 cases? Is deliberate indifference a hindrance or enabler 
 
138 Id. at 803, 808 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
139 See generally Harris, 489 U.S. 378. 
140 Elliott v. Jones, No. 4:06CV89-MP/AK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91125, at *14 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 
1, 2009). 
141 Brown, 520 U.S. at 397. 
142 Achtenberg, supra note 117. 
143 Bennett, 728 F.2d 762. 
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of Congress’s specific intent with § 1983 cases? These rulings and hundreds of 
others serve to continue the hurdle of proving municipality liability for § 1983 
plaintiffs.144 
However, although state actors can apply Deliberate Indifference to deny civil 
rights, the crux of the matter centers around citizens being harmed or killed by a 
peace officer while in custody when not an apparent risk of harm to the police 
officer or others. And then there is the defense of “Excited Delirium” diagnosis in 
cases where unarmed citizens “mysteriously die” in the custody of peace officers.145 
The Excited Delirium diagnosis is used by law enforcement to explain why an 
unarmed suspect mysteriously dies after being aggressively and violently arrested 
and cuffed by officers, and in some cases, “hog-tied.” The defense often centers 
around the assumed use of narcotics, which in some cases is ruled out by the 
medical examiner. In fact, according to Dr. Michael Baden, a medical examiner in 
New York, excited delirium should not be considered a valid cause of death at all:146 
 
Usually, people are dying of asphyxiation because police restrained 
them in prone positions—a cause of death that has a long and well 
history, he said. It’s just a means of dismissing or whitewashing too 
much force used by law enforcement…There’s nothing scientific. 
The concept is: A person dies and you don’t find any other cause of 
death, then it’s excited delirium. My concern is that it seems to be a 
boutique diagnosis that’s largely used only when somebody dies 
during restraint by law enforcement.147 
 
 
144 Matthew J. Crown, et. al., Municipal Liability: Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway Toward 
Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91:3 DENVER UNIV. L. REV 584-585 (2014) (“…as more 
often is the case, plaintiffs must show that the alleged injury was caused by a municipality’s 
unwritten policy or by municipal inaction. In such cases, proving municipal liability is 
‘exceptionally difficult’ because the Supreme Court has instituted ‘rigorous standards of 
culpability and causation . . . to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions 
of its employee.’ Regardless of whether one agrees with the current approach to municipal 
liability, the result is that courts rarely find municipalities liable under § 1983. These onerous legal 
standards have the predictable consequence of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing municipal 
liability claims.”). 
145 See Brandon Lowrey, “Amid Deadly Arrest, ‘Delirium Diagnosis Draws New Scrutiny,’” Law 
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Moreover, excited delirium is not even recognized as a valid medical diagnosis 
according to the American Psychological Association, the American Medical 
Association, and the World Health Organization, yet the courts and law 
enforcement have used it to justify or explain away the death of unarmed American 
citizens while in a peace officer’s custody. Assuming excited delirium is valid, is it 
a question of deliberative indifference to fail to train peace officers when the 
supposed diagnosis of excited delirium dates back to 1980? According to Police 
Chief Ken Wallentine, West Jordan, Utah Police Department and former Chief of 
Law Enforcement for the Utah Attorney General, “Appellate court cases do send a 
clear message to officers and government officials: Training is critical.”148 
 
Deaths can often be prevented by police who know what the signs 
are, and know to treat it as a life-or-death medical emergency rather 
than a crime in progress. The goal…is to calmly contain and cool 
down the subject until paramedics can safely treat them. I like to say 
law enforcement officers are well-aware of excited delirium…[b]ut 
that’s not true.149 
 
Thus, does the absence of training on excited delirium diagnosis equate to 
Deliberate Indifference and in the case of Qualified Immunity, does excited 
delirium grant a pass for otherwise abusive conduct by peace officers? According 
to the § 1983 case, Roell v. Hamilton County Board of Commissioners, excited 
delirium granted such a pass to peace officers for the death of Mr. Gary Roell, who 
was naked, but armed with a flower basket and a garden hose.150 The Court ruled 
for the officers thus granting them Qualified Immunity.151 However, Judge Karen 
Moore’s dissent cited to Champion v. Outlook Nashville Inc. (argued by Johnnie 
Cochran, et. al.), which held that law enforcement officers must de-escalate a 
situation and use minimal force in cases where a person exhibits signs of mental 




150 870 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2017). 
151 Id. at 487. 
152 Id. at 490 (quoting Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004)) 
(Nashville, Tennessee police officers pepper sprayed a severely autistic man, Mr. Calvin D. 
Champion, who was handcuffed, bounded at his feet, and was not resisting arrest. They also 
applied pressure to his back. Mr. Champion later died in police custody. Affirming the judgement 
of the district court in favor of Mr. Champion, the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit said, 
“While the Officers undoubtedly faced unenviable choices in their interactions with Champion, 
they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Based upon the testimony presented at trial, the 
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Unfortunately, unlike Roell, the citizen in police custody is often simply 
discovered deceased without explanation. In his book, Journey to Justice,153 
Johnnie Cochran discusses how Ron Settles, a high school star football athlete was 
found hung in his cell in 1981 one day after he was arrested for allegedly possessing 
cocaine, assaulting an officer, resisting arrest, and failing to produce an 
identification card (all misdemeanors). An autopsy by a second medical examiner 
determined that Ron Settles died from a choke hold, an opinion that differed from 
the Los Angeles medical examiner’s previous findings. Following this case, and 
others, in 1982, Los Angeles banned the so-called choke hold.154 
Case law preceding Settles provides a more comprehensive foundation for 
eliminating the concept of Deliberate Indifference in from a § 1983 case against a 
municipality. However, the road to eradicating Deliberate Indifference has been 
fraught with significant potholes. For example, in Los Angeles v. Lyons,155 the 
Supreme Court ruled against an injunctive relief prayer asking the Court to rule that 
law enforcement stop using [and training] chokeholds; unfortunately, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision stated the Defendant, Mr. Adolph Lyons, a 1976 
victim of the deadly chokehold, apparently did not have “standing” to request the 
injunctive relief sought because he cannot prove that he will be choked again in the 
future. Does this ruling support Congress’s Legislative Specific Intent? 
In Lyons (1976), Mr. Adoph Lyons, an African American citizen, was stopped 
for a misdemeanor traffic violation, a broken taillight, and later choked by Los 
Angeles peace officers until he was unconscious, bleeding and had urinated in his 
pants. Although Mr. Lyons did not resist, and followed the orders of Los Angeles 
peace officers, these peace officers, following their implicit departmental training 
and policy, placed Mr. Lyons in a choke hold that caused him to lose consciousness 
and that damaged his larynx. He sued the City of Los Angeles in Federal District 
court in a § 1983 suit and requested an injunction against use of the chokehold in 
non-life threatening situations. Mr. Lyon’s requested relief under § 1983 for denial 
of his civil rights under the 4th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
was granted, as was his injunctive relief request. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court’s ruling: 
 
 
Officers' actions in this particular situation violated Champion's clearly established rights”). 
Champion, 380 F.3d at 896. 
153 Cochran, supra note 97, at 167-88. 
154 Larry Altman, Chokeholds have been banned in Los Angeles for decades, Daily Breeze (Dec. 
4, 2014) (“In May 1982, the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners and City Council 
banned the two types of chokeholds that caused deaths, either by blocking the airway or blood 
flow. Other departments followed suit”). 
155 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
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The court found that “[during] the course of this confrontation, said 
officers, without provocation or legal justification, applied a 
Department-authorized chokehold which resulted in injuries to 
plaintiff.” The court found that the “City of Los Angeles and the 
Department authorize the use of these holds under circumstances 
where no one is threatened by death or grievous bodily harm.” The 
court concluded that the use of the chokeholds constitutes “deadly 
force,” and that the city may not constitutionally authorize the use 
of such force “in situations where death or serious bodily harm is 
not threatened.”156 
 
When the case got to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982, however, the Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the injunctive relief 
request, again citing standing. Adding yet another barrier to reimagining peace 
officers, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that regarding the use of the choke hold, a 
policy of the LAPD, deliberate indifference is not a factor because there is no 
inference to be drawn of substantial harm157 [leading to death] from the use of the 
chokehold. Furthermore, given that a number of victims continued to be killed by 
peace officers using the chokehold after the injunction was granted by the District 
and Appeals courts, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately sustained the practice, 
stating that the policy of using a choke hold by peace officers does not amount to 
deliberate indifference. In fact, Chief Darrel Gates, the Los Angeles Police 
Department commanding officer at the time, stated that the Court’s decision was a 
vindication of his Department.158 “We may be finding that in some blacks when 
[the choke hold] is applied, the veins and arteries do not open as fast as they do in 
normal people.”159 
In the dissenting opinion, the Court, led by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, Justice Brennan, and Justice Stevens, noted that in circa 1980, African 
Americans accounted for 9% of the population in Los Angeles, but represented 
75% of the deaths caused by peace officers using chokehold.160 They also 
 
156 Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. at 113. 
158 Dave Gilson, Thurgood Marshall Blasted Police for Killing Black Men With Chokeholds, 
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 4, 2014) (“While the case was being considered, the LAPD temporarily 
suspended its use of the bar-arm hold, where pressure is applied to the windpipe, and the carotid 
chokehold, where pressure is applied to the carotid artery”). 
159 Id. 
160 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 116 n. 3 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Thus in a city 
where Negro males constitute 9% of the population, they have accounted for 75% of the deaths 
resulting from the use of chokeholds. In addition to his other allegations, Lyons alleged racial 
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concluded that the “chokehold” was part of the policy and training given to 
members of the Los Angeles Police Department. Again, yet after the Los Angeles 
County District Court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the use of the 
chokehold in 1980, six additional deaths occurred, even after the U.S. Court of 
Appeals stayed the District Court’s preliminary injunction and while the matter was 
being appealed. Justice Marshall’s, et. al., artfully crafted dissent is best summed 
up in the first paragraph of the Dissent: 
 
The District Court found that the city of Los Angeles authorizes its 
police officers to apply life-threatening chokeholds to citizens who 
pose no threat of violence, and that respondent, Adolph Lyons, was 
subjected to such a chokehold. The Court today holds that a federal 
court is without power to enjoin the enforcement of the city's policy, 
no matter how flagrantly unconstitutional it may be. Since no one 
can show that he will be choked in the future, no one-not even a 
person who, like Lyons, has almost been choked to death-has 
standing to challenge the continuation of the policy. The city is free 
to continue the policy indefinitely as long as it is willing to pay 
damages for the injuries and deaths that result. I dissent from this 
unprecedented and unwarranted approach.161 
  
Res Ipsa Loquitur,162 deliberate indifference, a judicially imposed precedent 
amounting to a marked departure from Congress’s clearest intent with § 1983 
 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment paras. 10, 
15, 23, 24, 25, 30. Of the 16 deaths, 10 occurred prior to the District Court's issuance of the 
preliminary injunction, although at that time the parties and the court were aware of only 9. On 
December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Four 
additional deaths occurred during the period prior to the grant of a further stay pending filing and 
disposition of a petition for certiorari…and two more deaths occurred thereafter”) (referring to Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 453 U.S. 1308 (1981)). 
161 Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
162 “Res ipsa loquitur means, roughly, ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ Courts developed the concept 
of res ipsa loquitur to deal with cases in which the actual negligent act cannot be proved, but it is 
clear that the injury was caused by negligence. This doctrine was first recognized in the case of a 
man who was struck and severely injured by a barrel that rolled out of the second-story window of 
a warehouse. In the trial of the case, the defense attorney argued that the plaintiff did not know 
what events preceded the barrel rolling out of the window and thus could not prove that a 
warehouse employee was negligent. The plaintiff’s attorney countered that barrels do not normally 
roll out of warehouse windows. The mere fact that a barrel fell from the window was res ipsa 
loquitur; ‘it spoke for itself,’ and it said that someone must have been negligent.” Edward 
Richards, Res Ipsa Loquitur, PUB. HEALTH L. MAP - BETA 5.7, 
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/ResIpsaLoquitur.html. 
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matters, proscribes no accountability for the municipality and no motivation to 
reimage peace officers or amend their training, or hold peace officers accountable 
under their thin blue line.163 Who is going to change this judicially imposed 
standard? Congress must act in this judicial restraint era, holding accountable 
peace officers and their municipalities for abuse of police discretion and to 
eliminate the concept of deliberate indifference from the calculus of judicial 
examination of discretionary abuse cases. Municipal accountability for 
Constitutional offenses committed by peace officers must occur if, as a Nation, we 
are to reimagine the concept of a peace officer. 
And convincing those responsible for the conduct of rogue peace officers and 
repercussions is an indispensable step. Simply defunding police departments does 
not serve to support a positive change in policy, culture or practice. Holding police 
departments and municipalities accountable sends the clearest message for change. 
Additionally, holding a municipality accountable for an officer who violates a 
citizen’s Constitutional rights will send a clear message across a single police unit 
that such violations will not be tolerated. It will also motivate the Department’s 
leaders to take affirmative steps to reduce incidences of police abuse. Furthermore, 
when this top to bottom approach on standards is implemented as a matter of 
leadership and management, peace officers will be sufficiently motivated to follow 
their Unit’s policies and procedures. Thus, eradicating the judicially imposed 
standard of a plaintiff having to prove deliberate indifference is just one step further 
to eliminating police abuse against American citizens, and will be a monumental 




It is respectfully requested that § 1983 and 10 USC §§ 241 and 242 be amended. 
According to Colonel Ian Sablad, USAF Ret.:164 “Years after Congress enacted 
 
163 “In the 1950s, Los Angeles police Chief Bill Parker picked up the term [Thin Blue Line], 
mentioning it in speeches and adopting it as the title of a TV show he conceived to promote a 
polished image of the Los Angeles Police Department, which had been plagued by a history of 
corruption within the force. Parker left behind a controversial legacy. Under his leadership, the 
LAPD faced accusations of police brutality and racism as it transformed into more 
professionalized and militarized force that engaged in proactive policing — changes Parker 
viewed as necessary to ensure public safety. Parker himself made a series of racist comments 
about Blacks and Latinos during his tenure, including in the midst of the 1965 Watts riots.” David 
Hernandez, The thin blue line: The history behind the controversial police emblem, S.D. Union-
Tribune, July 6, 2020. 
164 Interview with Colonel Ian Sablad, USAF Retired (Sept. 1, 2020). Mr. Sablad is a former 
United States Air Force Security Forces Flight Commander and graduate of University of 
Colorado, Boulder where he received his BS. He is also a graduate of Webster University where 
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section 1983, attorneys, legislators and citizens are questioning the statute’s 
effectiveness as a legal tool for deterring policy misconduct.”165 Under 42 U.S.C 
1983, the judicially imposed “deliberate indifference standard” and “qualified 
immunity protection” standard for civil liability cases brought against a 
municipality must be summarily eradicated if this Nation is fulfill the promises of 
Equal Protection and Congress’s specific intent to enact appropriate legislation. 
Similarly, under 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242, the statutorily imposed requirement of 
specific intent or “willful” burden of proof for criminal cases must equally be 
eradicated to ensure Equal Protection and Congressional specific intent. 
With the onslaught of cases involving unnecessary police abuse and indeed 
targeted law enforcement against American citizens, primarily African Americans, 
our judicial system has imposed barriers to justice. Some courts tried and 
succeeded, only to be Remanded and Reversed, ultimately resulting in a systematic 
miscarriage of justice. And most egregious in this color of law criminal enterprise 
are the numerous unjustifiable homicides committed by the Wyatt Earp’s or rogue 
peace officers using unwarranted deadly force upon American citizens. Under 
skewed and deliberate judicial reasoning, the municipality is often absolved of 
liability or responsibility. 
Congress must amend § 1983 and §§ 241 and 242. The die is cast (Iacta alea 
est) with 1) Colorado’s Enhanced Law Enforcement Integrity ACT, Senate Bill 20-
217, which clearly redefines, reinforces and strengthens Congress’s specific intent, 
giving little variance upon which a court can later misinterpret or misconstrue this 
intent; 2) Senators Kamala Harris, Edward Markey, and Cory Booker’s U.S. Senate 
Bill calling for the abolishment of the qualified immunity defense in § 1983 cases; 
and 3) the U.S. House of Representatives’ George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 
2020, H.R. 7120, introduced by Representative Karen Bass. Now is the time for 
Congress to act by introducing and duly passing federal legislation and other 
 
he received his MA in management and business. He served in the Air Force for 27 years; during 
such time, he was an officer in USAF Security Forces for three years where he served as a 
Security Forces Flight Commander and Base SWAT Team Leader. Colonel Sablad supervised 
over 170 law enforcement officers during his time with law enforcement. His officers dealt with 
offenses ranging from domestic assaults to drug possession/use, larceny, and disturbance of the 
peace for a base population of over 30,000 people. Colonel Sablad said: “We [US Air Force] do 
not simply put crimes committed by our police officers under the rug, we deal with it openly and 
through that, other Security Forces members learn quickly that certain behaviors will simply not 
be tolerated.  We do not protect our cops who misbehave, nor do we cover up their crimes.  This is 
one of the reasons why, in my 27 years on active duty, I have never seen one instance of a Security 
Forces officer violating a person’s ‘Constitutional rights’ through abusive policing. It is simply not 
in our culture and again, simply not tolerated.” 
165 Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring 
Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 753, 753 (1993). 
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measures to ensure the promises of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
for all American citizens, and of emergent significance, Americans of African 
Descent, Black Lives Matter. 
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